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Radical right-wing parties have been increasing their electoral success across Europe over the last 
few decades. Despite the widely covered surge in their success, many radical right-wing parties 
have achieved marginal to no electoral success, but there continues to be a lack of research trying 
to explain their failure. The question guiding this thesis focuses on why there is varied electoral 
success of radical right-wing parties across Europe and suggests that it could be explained through 
differences in the importance of economic compared to cultural-political issues in each country. 
To investigate this, the work uses data from public opinion surveys and party manifesto content 
from three countries which saw different radical right-wing party success in elections between 
2005 and 2011 - Finland, Norway, and Iceland. Tentative findings indicate that cultural issues 
were the most salient in the public and amongst parties in the country with the most electorally 
successful radical right-wing party, Norway. Broadly, however, the public is still much more 
focused on economic issues than cultural issues, but political party rhetoric is much more evenly 
divided. Partisanship is the most influential factor on vote choice and though issue salience was 
rarely significant in vote choice, it was nearly always significant when trying to explain 
partisanship. Though issue salience is not directly influencing vote choice, it is influencing 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Radical right-wing populist parties (RRWP) have been emerging in countries across the 
world, but nowhere have they seen as much broad electoral success cross-nationally as Europe. 
Over the last few decades, parties of this family have burst onto the electoral scene. In some 
countries, they have changed the electoral arena by becoming a mainstream party, like in 
Switzerland and Austria, and in other cases, failed to make much of an electoral impact at all, 
like in Iceland, Ireland, and for some time, Germany. Between 1980 and 2013, RRWP have 
participated in only eight governments of the more than 200 national governments that have been 
formed in Europe (Mudde 2013: 4). This, however, does not mean that the radical right has not 
impacted the positions and attention given to some issues in the political arena, the radicalization 
of certain policy areas, or the issues that the public sees as important. This paper will investigate 
what factors have enabled the institutionalization of the radical right as a significant electoral 
competitor in some party systems but not others.  
Academic interest in the rise of radical right parties in Europe began in the 1990s, 
following the mass emergence of far-right parties across the continent throughout the 1970s and 
1980s (Betz 1994; Ignazi 1992, 1996; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mudde 1996, 1999). Academic 
research focused on the new political issues that became important during this period, namely 
cultural-political issues influenced by the rise of liberal social movements.  Beginning in the 
1970s, social movements were focused on social equity and liberalism and the movements 
related issues become political issues that competed with the traditional economic issues. New 
issues were integrated into party platforms resulting in newly formed competing party positions 
on cultural issues. In general, the left-wing parties adopted socially liberal positions on cultural 
issues and right-wing parties adopted socially conservative positions.  
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These new issues and their cleavages often offered an opportunity for new political 
parties to develop to represent these newly relevant policy positions. This is when many radical 
right parties began to take shape and began the modern phenomenon this work will try to 
explain. In many Western European countries party competition was restructured by these issues, 
which led to increased polarization of party platforms between existing parties and new more 
radical parties that incorporated more polarized policy positions (Betz 1993: 413). Social 
liberalization and the growth of the left in particular fostered the emergence of an opposing 
socially conservative movement towards the right side of the political spectrum. This was 
evidenced by the emergence of an assortment of radical right-wing parties competing across 
Europe, be they tax populist or neofascist. By the 1990s, many of these far-right parties had 
grown to share common ideological beliefs, namely nationalism, xenophobia, strong law and 
order, and welfare state protectionism (Mudde: 1996).  
 When looking at patterns of parties’ emergence and varied electoral success, one of the 
most common investigations is into sociodemographic factors and political attitudes. Research 
on sociodemographic factors that could be indicative of support for far-right parties has found 
that cross-nationally far-right supporters tend to be under 30, low-skilled workers, males, and 
small business owners (Andersen & Bjorklund 1990; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Bale 2003; Betz 
1993; Coffe 2005; Coffe & Voorpostel 2010; Inglehart & Norris 2017; Ivarsflaten 2005; Lubbers 
et al 2002; Mudde 1999; Norris 2005; 2006; Oesch 2008; Rydgren 2001; Taggart 1995). One of 
the most interesting factors found in some studies is the significant amount of former left-wing 
voters, traditionally Social Democratic (left-wing) voters, who have begun to vote for RRWP 
(Andersen & Bjorklund 2008; Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; Immerzeel et al. 2016; Mair 1989; 
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Zaslove 2008). This move is theoretically against the economic interests of those voters, yet 
many switch anyway.  
This ‘irrational’ political behaviour therefore must have ulterior motivations other than 
political attitudes and preferences based around economic interests or economic stability.  The 
primary motivation behind this study is to identify and examine the factors that influence voter 
decisions, and how these factors drive voter realignment supporting radical right-wing parties.  
Radical right-wing parties have been able to capture voters from across the political spectrum. 
Though common sociodemographic factors are connected to RRWP voters, there are many 
countries with these demographics which do not have RRWP or have one that has achieved little 
to very marginal electoral success. This is even more puzzling when countries with very similar 
demographics and political histories have had diverging RRWP electoral success. For example, 
in the Nordic region where Denmark and Norway have two of the most electorally successful 
RRWP and Iceland which has no RRWP.  
Existing literature has highlighted the importance of political divisions and how these 
divisions reshaped party competition and allowing RRWP to join the political mainstream. 
However, considering how much work has been done looking at the new cultural dimensions and 
cleavages and their effect on radical right-wing parties, there is a gap in the literature on how the 
public prioritizes different issues and dimensions and if this effects RRWP support. Seeing as 
sociocultural issues and their emergence helped introduce RRWP to party systems, it could be 
possible that the increased presence of such relevant sociocultural issues in a political arena is 
directly related to the electoral success of RRWP.  
The relevance of cultural issues and economic issues to parties since the emergence of the 
radical right has been touched on by some authors. Most work focuses on issue salience in party 
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discourse or the media (Green-Pedersen 2007; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008; Green-
Petersen & Odmalm 2008; Green-Pedersen & Otjes 2017; Wagner & Meyer 2014). Some studies 
examine issue positioning and salience, although most work still focuses primarily on parties 
(Immerzeel & et al. 2016; Ivarsflaten 2005; Meyer & Wagner 2018; Spoon & Kluever 2014; van 
der Brug 2004). The investigation of issue salience in the public is especially underdeveloped 
literature, though one undoubtedly worthy of investigation when trying to understand what leads 
people to vote for RRWP. While it is clear that many political systems compete on two political 
dimensions, economic and sociocultural, understanding whether citizens and parties have 
increasingly prioritized issues of one dimension electorally would give insight into which issues 
are framing political competition.  
If cultural issues have become more important to voters and parties, then a whole new 
generation of voters and political actors may see and understand politics in cultural, rather than 
economic terms (Bornschier 2010: 22). This may be beneficial to the radical right due to their 
focus on cultural issues like immigration, multiculturalism, morality, and law and order. Cultural 
issues normally result in group formation based on values, whereas economic issues create 
groups based on economic status. Cultural issues include issues like language, religion, morality, 
and more recently multiculturalism, immigration, nationalism, climate change, and law and 
order, all issues which exist and form groups independently of economic influences. Economic 
issues include issues like labour markets, unemployment, the welfare state, wages, and taxation, 
all of these issues are intrinsically linked to economic systems.  
To examine the comparative electoral success of radical right parties, this paper suggests 
that that a) in countries where cultural issues are more important, the radical right is more likely 
to succeed electorally because b) in those countries political parties and voters have prioritized 
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cultural issues over economic issues during elections. Based on these assumptions the following 
hypotheses are proposed:  
H1: Radical right-wing parties are more likely to be electorally successful if citizens find 
cultural issues more important than economic issues. 
 
If citizens find cultural issues more important than economic issues, then it would be rational for 
them to base their vote choice on their cultural issue preferences. If a voter has right-wing 
cultural issue preferences and found these issues to be the most important when considering their 
vote choice, then a vote cast based on ideological proximity to a party would suggest that a 
radical right-wing party would be the most appropriate choice.  
H2: Radical right-wing parties are more likely to be electorally successful if mainstream 
political parties focus on cultural issues more than economic issues. 
 
If mainstream parties have engaged in discussion around cultural issues that the radical right 
address (or even the radical left) they legitimize the new cultural issues by introducing them to 
mainstream discourse. If the mainstream parties focus on cultural issues related to the radical 
right, they may reframe political competition by placing greater emphasis on cultural issues for 
voters. 
This study will investigate the variance of radical right-wing party electoral success 
across Nordic countries, specifically Finland, Iceland, and Norway. The Nordic countries 
provide similar political, cultural, and social history that make the difference in electoral success 
of radical right-wing parties between countries worth investigating (the selection of these three 
cases will be discussed in more depth later). By looking at the comparative salience of cultural 
and economic issues in public opinion and party manifestos for national elections between 2005 
and 2011, the study will try to identify if cultural issues have influenced the electoral success of 
RRWP in Norway, the more limited electoral success of RRWP in Finland, and the absence of 
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RRWP in Iceland during the period indicated. Electoral success will be measured by looking at 
the increase in vote share and seat share in national parliamentary elections.1 For the purpose of 
this paper electoral success will focus on the radical right-party receiving comparable vote share 
and seat share to the mainstream parties. An investigation into these countries can help 
illuminate under what circumstances the far-right succeeds, and what may limit its electoral 
success.  
Using public opinion and party manifesto data for two elections in each country, this 
paper has drawn some preliminary conclusions on the relationship between issue salience and 
RRWP electoral success. An analysis of public opinion found that sociocultural issues were of 
equal or more importance to voters in Norway, and that sociocultural issues were important to 
voters of all parties. Comparatively, in both Finland and Iceland there was a strong preference 
for economic issues. Multivariate analysis of the public survey responses showed that issue 
salience was most likely to affect vote choice in Norway, and rarely influenced vote choice in 
Finland and Iceland. Manifesto content analysis of mainstream parties in Norway found that 
there is a significant focus on sociocultural issues. In Finland and Iceland, mainstream party 
focus is mixed between economic and sociocultural issues and varies by the party.  In Finland, 
the RRWP heavily favoured sociocultural issues and interestingly in Norway, the radical right 
party had a slight preference for economic issues.  
A general and tentative conclusion could be made that in Norway sociocultural issues 
have become more salient than economic issues in both public and party rhetoric and this has 
played a part in the electoral success of the RRWP as voters think more about cultural issues 
than economic issues during elections. This identification of the predominant preference in 
 
1 Finland, Iceland, and Norway all have unicameral legislatures. 
7 
Norway for sociocultural issues could be especially relevant for countries that have highly 
electorally successful RRWP, like Switzerland and Austria.  Investigations into more European 
countries and the importance of issue salience in such countries could shed light on whether a 
shift in political emphasis from economic to sociocultural issues could explain RRWP electoral 
success across the continent. 
This thesis will begin by outlining the existing literature that has endeavoured to explain 
radical right-wing party electoral success, focusing on party competition and voter behaviour. 
Next, I will outline the methods used to try to answer the research question and test the 
hypotheses that have been presented. This will be followed by three country case studies on 
Finland, Norway, and Iceland, these will each outline the political history and competition of 
each country before quantitative analysis of manifesto content and public opinion data. The 












Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The electoral success of political parties, including radical right-wing parties, is complex 
and influenced by a variety of factors. The literature on radical right-wing parties has been 
largely housed in that of party competition, public opinion, and political behaviour. These three 
areas all play greatly into the electoral success of any party and have thoroughly developed 
literature. Each of these sets of literature has broadly covered European parties and voters, with 
some Nordic specific studies which are used when available. When trying to establish the 
relevance of this work within the existing literature on radical right-wing party success,2 it is 
important to show how each of these related topics has set out to explain RRWP success. Though 
the existing literature provides some answers to explain radical right-wing success, it has yet to 
satisfactorily explain the variance in party success in different countries. Each of these topics 
does, however, help explain why issue salience is a worthy explanatory factor. Each of them 
touches on the relevance of cultural and economic issues to party success, but not in the same 
way or nearly as in-depth a manner that this thesis will. 
  First, the review will define RRWP ideology and the party type as a party family within 
Nordic party systems. Next, it will discuss the RRWP voter and recent re- and de-alignment of 
voters along new dimensions and cleavages. Then political competition and the influence of 
cross-pressures and priming on the voter will be covered to help set up the discussion of public 
opinion. Party interaction and opportunities will be covered, as this is relevant to the analysis of 
manifesto data. Finally, work done on the importance of economic factors will be introduced. 
The literature covered will set up how this study will contribute to ongoing work on RRWP in 
party competition and political behaviour in Nordic party systems.  
 
2 The term ‘success’ always refers to electoral success.  
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2.1 Radical Right-Wing Party ideology  
Radical right-wing party ideology is significant because it defines the beliefs and values 
that the party stands for, as many of the beliefs of radical right-wing parties are based around 
culturally non-economic values and preferences. Ideally, a voter’s electoral choice is based on 
sharing ideological beliefs with a party, so what beliefs and values that party has is therefore key 
to understanding their electoral success. Mudde (1996: 229) surveyed RRWP definitions to try 
and identify key ideological features and found that 58 different beliefs or values of the RRWP 
ideology have been mentioned in the literature, and so the actual ideology of radical right parties 
is still debated and remains unclear.  
The classic and most basic definition of the RRWP ideology up to this point is Mudde’s 
(2010) which identifies three core characteristics: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. 
Nativism is the belief that states should be inhabited by only people native to that country. It 
focuses on the nation-state and the idea that non-native entities are threats to the homogenous 
state (Mudde 2010: 1174).  Though nativism and nationalism may seem identical to the racism of 
the radical right fascist parties of the past, they are different concepts. For example, nativism and 
nationalism use “differentialist nativism” or “cultural differentialism”, rather than ethnic racism 
which is why nativism is the preferred term (Bornschier 2010, 5). Rooduijn (2014: 80) refers to 
this specific type of nationalism used by modern RRWP as ‘nativism’: the ‘Good’ nation-state is 
threatened by ‘Evil’ outsiders who undermine collective homogeneity. Authoritarianism is the 
principle that the state should have an ordered society where the opposition is punished. 
Authoritarianism is also used in conservatism (Mudde 2002: 1174).  Finally, populism suggests 
that there are two groups in society the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’. These three core 
characteristics help outline the basic shared beliefs of RRWP cross-nationally. 
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2.1.1. Populism 
 Populism is a term often used when talking about radical right-wing parties, but unlike 
nativism and authoritarianism, it is more complex to understand. In the context of radical right-
wing parties, populism has additional features that are relevant to outline which make RRWP 
populism unique. The first feature of populism that influences radical right-wing party politics is 
the belief that politics should be an expression of the people, and so RRWP are often proponents 
of direct democracy.  ‘New populism’ is the name given to the populism that defines RRWP 
which centres around ‘the people’. ‘The people’ is a group that is portrayed as the virtuous and 
homogenous group of a region, often a nation (Zaslove 2008, 322). Populism tends to be used in 
tandem with other stronger ideologies like nationalism, socialism, or communism (Mudde 2004: 
544). For RRWP populism it is used in tandem with nationalism. This form of populist 
nationalism and nativism tends to portray ‘others’ as a threat to the people, but instead of others 
being exclusively elites as in traditional populism, foreigners define ‘others’ in populist 
nationalism (Art 2007, 332).  
This kind of populism can also be understood as exclusionary populism as it focuses on 
excluding non-natives and ethnic/cultural minorities from material goods - such as jobs, housing, 
welfare services, and giving primary access to these goods to natives of the country (Mudde & 
Kaltwasser: 2013). It is also exclusionary in a political sense, as they often attempt to limit the 
political rights of immigrants. Finally, it excludes non-natives and minorities symbolically, as 
‘the people’ in populist nationalism is defined by the ethnic natives of the state. Right-wing 
parties are the only party type that employs an exclusionist meaning of community (Bornschier 
2010: 7). It should be noted that populist discourse is not uncommon in many countries and it is 
used by even mainstream parties across the political spectrum. A frequently cited example is the 
use of populism by the New Labour Movement under Tony Blair in the UK (Mudde 2013: 9; 
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Mudde 2004: 549; Rooduijn et al 2012: 564), but it is the use of exclusionary populism by 
RRWP that is unique.  
2.1.2. Three Waves of Right-Wing Populism 
Far-right parties have been competing in elections since the early twentieth century and 
are most notable for taking a significant role in the political history of many countries toward the 
mid-twentieth century. However, the radical right-wing parties competing in modern elections 
are not necessarily always direct successors of these historical versions of the party type. The 
characteristics of the modern party type are integral to their recent electoral success and make up 
their version of the party type. Andersen and Bjorklund (2008) have defined three ‘waves’ of 
populist parties in Europe, and each has its distinct features.  
The first wave emerged in many countries in the 1930s and is defined by the fascist 
extreme-right Nazi parties of the Second World War. This wave and its characteristics are most 
often thought of when one hears the terms radical right or far-right parties. Some of the key 
features of this wave, like fascism and biological/hierarchical racism, are missing in most of the 
far-right parties of today. In Scandinavia, neo-fascist parties also emerged in the 1950s, though 
they failed to gain much electoral support. These 1950s parties are still considered part of the 
first wave due to their shared beliefs (Anderson & Bjorklund 2008: 3). The second wave was the 
populist tax protest parties of the 1970s. These were considered right-wing mostly due to their 
economic ideology. In Scandinavia, these parties focused predominantly on neoliberal policies, 
but they also presented as anti-elitist, had a populist political style (rather than ideology), and 
despite arguing for tax cuts, demanded more money for health care and old-age pensions. Many 
of these features have been carried into third wave radical right-wing parties (Anderson & 
Bjorklund 2008: 4). The most notable example of the party type of the second wave was the 
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Scandinavian tax protest parties. The third wave is the current xenophobic, nationalist, populist 
party, which was born in the 1980s.  
Rydgren (2005: 413) argues that the first successful modern RRWP was the National 
Front, which established itself in France in the 1970s and 1980s and that this party influenced the 
emerging RRWP across Europe in the 1980s. Contrary to popular belief, this wave does not have 
fascist or neofascist tendencies, because in general, the parties are pro-democracy (which is why 
the term ‘extreme right’ will not be used as it suggests illiberal beliefs). Their racism is not 
hierarchical or biological as that of the first wave but instead is cultural, ethnopluralist 
xenophobic. Hierarchical/biological racism purports that one race is superior to another. 
Ethnopluralism believes that to preserve national characteristics and culture that different 
peoples need to be kept separated to prevent the mixing of ethnicities which would lead to 
cultural extinction. It does not believe that one race is superior just that they are different and 
inherently incompatible (Rydren 2005: 427). Parties that have roots in the first wave of extreme 
right parties often have a more difficult time establishing themselves as respectable parties, such 
as the Swedish Democrats. Radical right-wing parties also often have difficulty in countries that 
had a particularly strong first wave, like Germany (Art 2007: 338; Bornschier 2012).  
Following their core ideology, modern RRWP focus on a key set of issues. These issues 
are part of the basis of the argument of this paper, so identifying the issues most often associated 
with the radical right can help explain why issue salience may be important when looking at 
electoral success. RRWP are not single-issue parties focused on immigration as some may 
believe them to be (Immerzeel et al, 2016; Mudde 1999; van der Brug 2004). The most common 
issues RRWP address are crime, law and order, nationalism, immigration, and European 
integration, or what Mudde called the populist radical right trinity of corruption–immigration–
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security (Mudde 2010: 1179). More specifically they may discuss welfare abuse (Bale 2003: 69), 
security, and national identity (Spies & Franzmann 2011). Though immigration is often very 
important they also address other issues (Taggart 1995: 40). In some cases, parties may have a 
position of economic liberalism (Kriesi et al, 2006). Based on their ideology and core issues, 
parties within the radical right-wing party family have generally focused on some common 
cultural issues, which is key to the arguments of this paper.  
2.2 European Party Families  
European party systems have relatively consistent party families cross-nationally that 
tend to structure party competition, party interactions, and coalition formation. The existence of a 
radical right-wing party family establishes a group of parties that can be considered when 
studying the radical right and shapes our understanding of how they fit into party competition. 
Ennser (2012) is often cited as the landmark study on European party families. He argues that 
party families can be identified if they share a) origins and sociology, b) transnational links, c) 
policy and ideology, and d) party name (Ennser 2012: 152). Ennser labels four main European 
party groupings. These are the Greens, Social Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives/Christian 
Democrats (Ennser 2012: 159), though more minor party families may exist like regionalist 
parties, agrarian parties, or ethnic/linguistic parties (Caramani 2004: 177). In some cases, the 
New Left is also described as a party family, made up of socialist or communist parties (Henjak 
2010: 438; Immerzeel et al. 2016; Knutsen: 1998; Kriesi et al 2006, 925).  
The RRWP is now also considered a party family, as they have a common ideology and 
common policy positions cross-nationally (Ennser, 2012: 151; Mudde 1996,  2010; Rydgren 
2005), and have been identified in several works as such (Henjak 2010: 485; Immerzeel et al., 
2016; Knutsen: 1998). Though they may not share the same names like Social Democratic or 
14 
Conservative parties, common RRWP names include: ‘front’, ‘movement’, ‘league’, ‘alliance’, 
‘bloc’, ‘union’ or ‘list’ (Ennser 2012: 157). They may also feature the words ‘freedom’ or 
‘people’s’ and use the country’s nation in their name (e.g. Danish, Austrian). In many countries 
where the radical right-wing party is electorally successful, it owns the issues of immigration, 
nationalism, and law and order (Immerzeel et al, 2016). In some cases, if the mainstream right-
wing is seen as equally capable of dealing with these issues, the radical right-wing party may 
share the issues with the right-wing party families. 
RRWP have recently been characterized as making up a tripolar party system defined by 
the groupings of party families on the left, the centre-right/moderate, and the right/far-right 
(Afonso & Papadopoulos, 2015: 621; Kriesi 2015: 727;). The left is made up of Social 
Democrats, Green, and the New Left, the centre-right/moderate with the Conservatives, Liberals, 
and Christian Democrats, and the right having just the RRWP. Mainstream party families, 
especially social democrats and conservative parties, have traditional economic positions that are 
integral to their political positioning and political competition. Whereas it is debated whether the 
far-right’s economic positions play any part in their ideology or influence public support.  
2.3 Typical Voters and Realignment 
A lot of research has been done to establish the ‘typical’ radical right-wing party voter to 
see if it is possible to explain RRWP success through certain sociodemographic characteristics 
and political attitudes. The findings have been replicated in several countries across Europe but 
the number of shared characteristics defining a radical right-wing party voter is more accurate in 
some countries than others. In the literature reviewed for this work, there were many 
characteristics of the typical RRWP voter and the most common have been gathered and listed 
here. The most common feature was being under-30 (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Betz 1993; 
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Coffe & Voorpostel, 2010; Lubbers et al 2002; Mudde, 1999; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2001, 2006; 
Taggart 1995), then being a manual/low-skilled worker (blue collar) (Andersen & Bjorklund 
1990; Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Bale 2003; Betz 1993; Lubbers et al 2002; Norris 2005; Oesch 
2008), being male (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Bale 2003; Betz 1993; Inglehart & Norris 2017; 
Lubbers et al 2002; Norris 2005; Taggart 1995), less educated (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Bale 
2003; Coffe 2005; Inglehart & Norris 2017; Lubbers et al 2002; Norris 2005; Taggart 1995), 
self-employed/small business owner (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Betz 1993; Ivarsflaten 2005; 
Lubbers et al 2002; Taggart 1995), pensioners (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Betz 1993; Inglehart 
& Norris 2017; Norris 2005), non-religious (Coffe 2005; Lubbers et al 2002; Norris 2005), 
previous non-voters ( Kitschelt & McGann 2005; Taggart 1995) and people that lack social ties 
(Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Coffe 2005). Lower educated voters are thought to vote RRWP 
because they work low-skilled jobs that are more likely to be taken by immigrants or because 
they may not have been exposed to liberal values through more extensive education (Arzheimer 
& Carter 2006, 421).  
Some suggest that people with the characteristics mentioned are often more reliant on the 
welfare system and are trying to protect their interests and access to welfare as they see 
immigrants as a threat to the system (Arzheimer & Carter 2006, 421). But both Kriesi and 
Grande (2012:13) and Oesch (2008) found that disdain for immigrants is mostly rooted in 
cultural values and national identity rather than personal economic well-being. Oesch (2008) 
found that cultural feelings related to immigration, such as a threat to national identity and 
differential nativism have a much stronger effect on RRWP vote choice than economic 
determinants like job competition from immigrants or welfare chauvinism. The characteristics 
present in the typical RRWP voter are also strikingly similar to the former typical Social 
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Democratic voter, and it has been found that many former left-wing voters have begun voting for 
RRWP (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008; Bale 2003; Bale et al. 2010; Immerzeel et al. 2016; Mair 
1989; Zaslove 2008). This move of working-class voters from voting for the left to the right is 
one of the most important determinants of RRWP support across some European countries.  
An excess of the typical characteristics of RRWP supporters mentioned being present in 
any given population is not enough for a radical right-wing party to be electorally successful.  
Though the examples outlined below do not cover the countries in this study, they do provide 
some valuable insight into the complexity of sociodemographic and opinions and vote choice. A 
study comparing Flanders and Wallonia look at voter characteristics and found that in Wallonia 
though there were more individual sociodemographic factors and attitudes, including anti-
immigration attitudes and non-religious population, that would theoretically support radical right 
success, but there is no successful radical right-wing party in Wallonia (Coffe 2005: 90). This is 
supported by Lubbers et al (2002) earlier finding that social structure composition cannot explain 
variation in RRWP support across countries. Actual attitudes towards immigrants also do not 
seem to be a good indicator of RRWP electoral success. In Belgium, Wallonians have stronger 
anti-immigrant attitudes compared to Flanders but they have no RRWP and Flanders does (Coffe 
2005: 86). Both Sweden and Denmark have similar attitudes about wanting to accept fewer 
refugees, but again the RRWP in Denmark has been much more electorally successful. This 
could be because the issue is more salient on the political agenda (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 
2008: 616). There was an increase in anti-immigrant feelings in every European country from 
1988 to 2000, but the most drastic increase in anti-foreigner sentiment was within the first half of 
that period and not every country developed a radical right-wing party at that time (Semyonov et 
al. 2006: 426). Public attitudes are not affected by the emergence of RRWP parties and the 
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relevant attitudes normally pre-date the existence of RRWP (Mudde 2013: 7). Typically attitudes 
that are associated with RRWP support tend to exist before the establishment of RRWP. 
2.4 Emergence of a New Dimension and New Cleavages 
2.4.1. Historical Cleavages 
Political divisions, also known as cleavages, identities, and allegiances have changed as 
society has evolved and faced new political issues, allowing new conflicting beliefs to form 
political conflicts. A political cleavage is defined as “a specific structure of political conflict that 
profoundly shapes their political systems… it was in particular West European countries where 
social conflicts took the form of ‘cleavages’” (Kriesi & Grande, 2012: 8). Kriesi (1998) says 
cleavages need to have three components, a “structural base, political values of groups involved, 
and political articulation” (165), and that social groups that are divided along a cleavage must be 
aware of their identity, represented by a political organization, and must actively make decisions 
based on that identity (167). Parties are often positioned so that they represent the political 
beliefs of a group along one side of a political division, but with new conflicts and divisions 
there is room for established parties to take a position and new parties to emerge. 
For much of the 20th century, most Western European party systems and politics could 
be understood through four cleavages - centre/periphery, secular/religious, rural/urban, and 
owner/worker conflict (Kriesi et al 2006, 923). These cleavages became embedded in the party 
system and structured political competition for much of the 20th century in Europe, resulting in 
the freezing hypothesis put forward by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Bartolini and Mair (1990) 
suggest a decline of these four traditional cleavages in the late 20th century and that they were at 
least partially replaced by a new cleavage based around values. This is suggested because voting 
began to be explained by value and issue preferences instead of structural or socio-demographic 
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variables (Kriesi 1998: 166). This indicates that social groups could be formed based on values 
and could be the base of a cleavage, rather than just an aspect of a cleavage (Kriesi 2010: 678).  
Some suggest that many of the traditional cleavages, like class, that existed in the frozen 
system are less prominent in modern politics and no longer explain voter ties or habits (Ignazi 
1992: 4; Kriesi 1998: 166, 923; Kriesi et al 2006: 923). This may be due to socioeconomic and 
sociocultural changes that occurred in the mid 20th century in much of Western Europe. 
Socioeconomically, there was a shift towards modernization, and a move from mass production 
to specialized manufacturing, a higher-skilled workforce, and a tertiary sector focus. The jobs in 
these new sectors required higher levels of education and skills and produced a new middle class 
made up of public sector employees and civil servant workers (Betz 1993; 420).   
Socioculturally, there were waves of secularization, the proliferation of the welfare state, 
and increased levels and access to education (Coman 2017: 249; Kriesi 1998: 168; Oesch & 
Rennwald: 2010). The proliferation of the welfare state meant that the importance of unions was 
becoming less relevant. The populist right was able to appeal to those who may have lost the 
group/collective identities of union members of the working class in the post-industrial age, with 
the RRWP offering a ‘national’ community in which people could belong (Oesch & Rennwald 
2010, 348).  Globalization, the opening of borders (Oesch 2008, 350), and European integration 
all become highly politicized in the 1980s and 1990s (Kriesi et al 2006: 924). Though these 
issues have many economic effects, they were often framed culturally by the RRWP and gained 
salience towards the end of the 20th century. 
2.4.2. The Influence of Societal Changes 
Post-war prosperity, economic security and sociocultural and socioeconomic changes 
resulted in the 1970’s New Social Movements and its libertarian postmaterialist ideas- which 
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introduced universalistic values, libertarianism, cultural liberalism and focused on issues like 
equal rights for women, LGBTQ+, minorities, alternative lifestyles, and the environment and 
these were all put on the political agenda (Betz, 1993: 413). With the emergence of liberal 
values, soon the opposite conservative values came onto the political agenda. Moral and cultural 
values and issues in the 1970s cut across and weakened the traditional left-right distributional 
economic class conflict. New Politics’ post-material issues that emerged in the 1970s created a 
new dimension defined by newly relevant political conflicts. Parties were forced to take a 
position on the new dimension, but the party’s position on cultural issues may not have been 
represented through the parties’ traditional economic left-right dimension position. This new 
dimension will be referred to as the sociocultural dimension (Bornschier 2010, 4; Inglehart & 
Norris 2017: 445). This sociocultural dimension focuses primarily on cultural issues and has 
been called by several different names, including the ‘post-materialism–materialism’ cleavage 
(Knutsen 1998), libertarian-authoritarian (Betz, 1993; Ennser, 2012; Grande & Kriesi 2012; Hino 
2012; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian 
(Bornschier 2010), Green-alternative-libertarian and traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (GAL-
TAN) (Kriesi 2015; De Lange, 2007).  
The post-material values and associated issues were adopted and represented by the 
Social Democrats by the late 1960s or by the new parties of the leftist socialists or Green parties 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Bornschier 2015: 682; Knutsen 1998: 65). Though the left extreme of 
postmaterialism was represented in Social Democratic parties relatively early, the creation of 
right-wing populist parties as a distinct opponent on cultural values did not emerge until the late 
1980s.  The Green parties and RRWPs were the parties born of New Politics, with the Greens 
coming from the silent revolution and RRWP emerging as a reaction (Ignazi 1992: 6). The 
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representation of the left resulted in a materialist New Right reaction, which led to the creation of 
xenophobic populist authoritarian parties, forming the bipolar dimension of these postmaterialist 
parties (Bornschier 2010:1; Inglehart & Norris 2017: 444; Ignazi 1992; Kriesi 1998; Bornschier 
2007). The New Left and New Right formed what Kriesi (2010) has called a new value-based 
dimension (673), best defined by the Green-alternative-libertarian and traditional-authoritarian-
nationalist, GAL-TAN acronym.  
The New Right values rejected individual and social equality, social integration of 
marginalized groups, used xenophobia/racism, and focused on a free marketplace, reducing the 
role of the state, a classical liberal economic position, law and order and traditional moral values 
(Betz 1993: 413, 421). Those issues of the New Right defined the parties in the 1980s, but 
modern parties have decreased their focus on economic issues and increased their focus on 
cultural liberal issues, specifically those of immigration, multiculturalism, and European 
integration (Kriesi et al 2006: 950). The new radical right-wing parties only began to focus on 
the cultural issues we associate with RRWP today, such as national demarcation against open 
borders, cultural homogeneity, and traditional authority in the late 1980s and 1990s (Oesch & 
Rennwald 2010: 347). Though many radical right-wing parties emerged in the 1980s, many 
parties only experienced a large increase in electoral success in the mid-late 1990s (Bornschier 
2010: 1). The issue of immigration specifically was adopted in the late 1980s by many populist 
right-wing parties, and this characteristic is one that has come to define the modern third wave 
RRWP (Bornschier 2010: 7; Arzheimer & Carter 2006: 427). In many countries where the 
RRWP achieved electoral success in the 1990s, cultural issues remain relevant, indicating a 
permanent new dimension (Bornschier 2010:7).  
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2.4.3. New and Old Cultural Dimensions 
In some countries, a ‘cultural’ dimension may have already existed, defined by cleavages 
structured on issues like religion, ethnicity, or language. In countries that had particularly strong 
old cultural cleavages, cultural issues were likely already salient and affecting the political 
structure of the party system. Often this allowed conflicts of new issues to be positioned easily 
within the existing cultural dimension (Bornschier 2010; Kriesi et al, 2006; Rovny & Polk 2019; 
Rydgren 2005). The historical conflict between culture and economic values has been studied 
before, as some countries have strong historic cultural cleavages. Henjak’s (2010) study found 
that the relationship between economic value orientations and vote choice is much stronger in 
countries that did not have strong historical cultural cleavages (religious, ethnic), like the United 
Kingdom and Scandinavian countries (also supported in Rennwald, 2014). This does suggest that 
the new cultural conflict is more likely to emerge and be strong in countries that previously had a 
significant cultural conflict (such as Switzerland). 
Lijphart’s (1979) early study found that religion and language were better predictors of 
vote choice than class in countries where there were ethnic/linguistic/religious divides present 
(450). If these ethnic or cultural divides are now present among the increasingly multicultural 
states in Europe, could they become the strongest predictors of vote choice?  Geertz (1963) 
found that primordial communal loyalties, like religion or language, can be very powerful, and 
they could prevent the presence of competing cleavages of socio-economic interests. Even 
Sartori found that "class is the major determinant of voting behaviour only if no other cleavage 
happens to be present" (1969: 76). If cultural issues have started to dominate party competition, 
politics could be understood in a cultural rather than an economic way.  
It is clear that there have been massive changes in Western European countries and there 
is increasing evidence that voting no longer conforms to social groups. Instead it is motivated by 
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personal values. It has been argued that the issue and the value-based voter has replaced the party 
identification and social class voter (Bornschier 2010; Gosselin 2008; Ignazi 1992, 1996; Kriesi, 
1998; Minkenburg 2013; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). The increasingly volatile elections in Europe 
(Betz 1993) suggest a dealignment, and potentially a realignment of voters in Western Europe 
from traditional societal based cleavages to value cleavages (Kriesi 2010: 674; Oesch & 
Rennwald: 2010). As new cultural topics became politicized, new parties emerged to represent 
beliefs based around these issues that were not previously addressed and forced old parties to 
adopt positions that may not have aligned with their positions on the economic left-right 
spectrum. 
2.5 Salience Based Competition and Cross Pressures 
To see whether these cleavages exist in certain political systems, one can look at the 
salience of certain issues in the minds of voters or party competition. Green-Pedersen (2007) 
looks at issue competition, defined as which content makes up political parties’ agendas or 
“party competition on which issues should dominate the party-political agenda.” Saliency theory 
proposes that parties compete using selective issues and avoid direct issue confrontation with 
other parties (Dolezal et al, 2014: 57).  This is in contrast to positional competition over a few 
issues where parties take varied positions on mainly the same socio-economic issues. Political 
competition has more recently been described as being based around both issue and positional 
competition (Van der Brug 2004; Green-Pedersen 2007; Meguid 2005).  
Belanger & Meguid (2008) investigated issue-based vote choice and issue ownership, the 
idea that parties and candidates try to mobilize voters by emphasizing issues they are competent 
at handling (issue reputations). If an issue is salient, then theoretically issue ownership should 
affect vote choice, and the more salient the issue, the more likely it is to affect vote choice 
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(Belanger & Meguid, 2008: 479). Parties do emphasize issues they own and deemphasize issues 
that are not favourable to them electorally (Dolezal et al, 2014: 58). This is supported by issue 
ownership theory “which argues that parties strategically increase the salience of those issues on 
which they hold advantaged positions while trying to mute issues somehow harmful to them.” 
(Rovny 2013, 5). Most parties compete on the same issues but hold different policy positions. 
There are especially diverging positions on sociocultural issues (Dolezal et al, 2014: 67, 69). 
This competition co-exists with Down’s (1957) spatial model of party competition.  
Issue saliency theory puts forth the idea that parties place different amounts of 
importance on different issues. What happens though, when parties have different positions on 
the socio-economic dimension and the sociocultural dimension? More importantly what happens 
if a voter’s two positions do not align with their usual party of choice? Herein lies the problem: if 
voters’ preferences on the socioeconomic dimension align with one party but their preferences 
on the sociocultural dimension align with another, which party should the voter choose? 
Theoretically, a voter’s choice would be “rational” if they choose a party that is ideologically 
similar to them, but if they are ideologically similar to more than one party then voters are faced 
with a difficult decision. This is why issue salience is critical to the success of RRWP, as the 
parties need to mobilize voters based on issues that were largely absent from political 
competition decades ago. The electoral success of RRWP comes from their ability to get voters 
from various parts of society (Zaslove 2008: 327) and their “peculiarity consists of their capacity 
to mobilize voters from all social strata and from all previous political alignments” (Ignazi 1992: 
5).  
Voters can hold positions on a variety of different issues, these positions can be 
contradictory if they fall on different sides of competing dimensions/cleavages. The importance 
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they give different issues has the potential to change which issue and issue position they 
prioritize when making vote choices (Ivarsflaten 2005: 467). This is best illustrated by someone 
holding left-wing economic positions, but right-wing cultural preferences (ibid: 468). The unique 
situation means that: 
“[Parties] do not have to sway voters to a new issue position, they have to shift them to a 
new issue: away from the socioeconomic issues, like (un)employment, and towards the 
sociocultural issues, like immigration. Therefore, the main struggle of the populist radical 
right party family is to increase the saliency of ‘their’ issues, i.e. corruption, immigration, 
and security” (Mudde, 2010: 1179). 
Although members of different social classes may share some values, there can also be a variety 
of preferences and behaviours, as “individuals who happen to have similar values for whatever 
reason also tend to have similar political preferences, even if they are in structurally different 
class positions” (Kriesi 1998: 174). 
RRWP have been particularly adept at appealing to voters by being right-wing on the 
liberal-authoritarian dimension but centre-left on the state-market dimension (Bale et al 2010: 
412, see also De Lange, 2007; Van Spanje and Van der Brug, 2009). But in countries where 
some RRWP are still right-wing economically, low skilled workers support the RRWP despite it 
being against their economic preferences (this was found to be true amongst Swiss People’s 
Party voters) (Oesch & Rennwald 2010: 362). Gougou & Labouret’s (2013: 86) study of the 
2002 French election found that “votes for Le Pen essentially depended on the cultural axis, 
almost systematically hitting maximum probability among voters belonging to the most ethno-
authoritarian decile, and this regardless of their position on the economic axis”. Afonso & 
Papadopoulos (2015) found that in Switzerland “working-class voters may vote for left parties 
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because of their socio-economic agenda, they predominantly vote for [populist right-wing 
parties] because of their positions on non-economic issues” (619). These findings support the 
idea that RRWP voters do share similar cultural values regardless of economic values, and that 
they might be weighing cultural issues more heavily when heading to the ballot box. 
2.5.1. Cross-Pressures 
Early evidence that Social Democratic voters were switching support to RRWP was 
found by Kitschelt & McGann (1995) and later several other studies have confirmed that the 
RRWP do take votes from left-wing parties (Bale 2003: 72; Bale et al. 2010; Coffe 2008: 179; 
Lubbers et al. 2002). To best illustrate the variety of competing preferences and identities 
citizens face, Oesch & Rennwald (2010: 348) give a portrait of the competing pulls of one voter 
in Switzerland: a Production worker’s economic identity as working-class (vote for Social 
Democrats), religious identity as Catholic (vote for Christian-Democratic Party), and cultural 
identity as a member of the national community (vote for Swiss People’s Party). This has also 
been described as cross-pressures (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee: 1954: Campbell et al: 
1964), or cross-cutting cleavages (Gosselin, 2008: 1).  Cross-pressures mean that some people 
are under conflicting influences for their vote choice; a “combination of characteristics which, in 
a given context, would tend to lead the individual to vote on both sides of a contest” (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee: 1954). 
Blue-collar workers and small business owners are the most overrepresented occupational 
groups in the RRWP electorate, but they hold polarized economic beliefs - strong state 
intervention compared to less state intervention. However, RRWP can build a coalition of voters 
based on the fact that these two groups “on average agree on position issues that cut across the 
economic left-right spectrum – the punishment of crimes, the restriction of immigration and 
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asylum, and limiting the reach of the European Union” (Ivarsflaten 2005: 489). This suggests 
that voters have not changed their economic preferences, but that their policy preferences on the 
cultural dimension are stronger vote motivators (Ivarsflaten 2005: 466). Rovny (2013) also found 
that RRWP supporters are divided on economic issues, but they support RRWP because they 
prioritize new political-cultural issues. Fossati & Hausermann’s (2014: 590) Swiss study 
suggests that electoral choice is culturally realigned and is shaped by “identity-based attitudes 
over issues such as immigration and supranational integration, rather than economic-distributive 
social policies”. 
 Both priming and agenda setting play a large part in how voters evaluate the political 
world. The average voter cannot pay attention to everything in the political world and this is 
important because what they do pay attention to is likely what they will decide is most relevant 
when making political decisions (Iyengar & Kinder 1987: 64). Priming is the process whereby 
different amounts of attention are given to some issues or considerations over others, and the 
effect these different amounts of attention have on a political decision (Iyengar & Kinder 1987: 
63). For example, going into an election a voter is faced with an abundance of political issues, 
like unemployment, foreign relations, immigration, the state of the welfare system and more, but 
priming would result in considering one of these political issues above others in their decision. In 
national elections, campaigning parties can “influence vote choices by priming attitudes towards 
certain issues” (Kleinnijenhuis, van Atteveldt, & Dekkers 2018: 570).  
Political actors can prime issues by setting the media agenda with issues. In theory, 
campaigns and their issues flow from political actors to the media and then to the public, because 
the media rely on official sources (Kleinnijenhuis, van Atteveldt, & Dekkers 2018: 570). This is 
the process of agenda-setting, where issues are made salient through the media to the public 
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(ibid). Though priming consists of agenda-setting, it’s primarily the process where “the issues in 
the news become the most salient considerations to decide whether and how to vote” (ibid), 
specifically “to increase the weight of the emphasized issues in decisions” (ibid). The goal of 
priming is not to change the attitudes of voters on a specific issue, like whether to support 
immigration or not, it is to increase the importance of the issue of immigration when a voter is 
considering which issues are most important in their vote choice. Priming will pay an important 
part in the cross-pressure voters face. 
2.6 New Winning Formula 
As discussed earlier, scholars have argued that Western European party systems are two-
dimensional, because a unidimensional spectrum is not sufficient to illustrate modern party 
competition. The original left-right dimension is economic, and the new dimension is cultural, 
with Green-alternative-libertarian and traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (GAL-TAN) most 
accurately addressing the cultural issues that are salient now. The positioning of RRWP parties 
on these dimensions was first theorized by Kitschelt’s original ‘winning formula’ - a radical 
right-wing party held a far-right-wing position both culturally and economically, with neoliberal 
economic policies and authoritarian and nationalist sociocultural policies (Ivarsflaten 2008: 6). 
However, Kitschelt’s formula originated in the 1980s and struggles to explain the recent 
positioning of many RRWP in the twenty-first century.  
De Lange’s (2007) ‘new winning formula’ suggests that RRWP hold centrist to centre-
left economic positions while holding far-right cultural positions and argues that the old winning 
formula explains the electoral success of RRWP in the 1980s but not in the 2000s (411). 
Ivarsflaten’s (2005: 478) study found that the Danish People’s Party and the National Front are 
centrist economically and extreme culturally. Inglehart and Norris’ (2019) most recent study 
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using Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2014 data found that the far-right: Austrian Freedom 
Party (FPO), Belgian Flemish Interest (VB), Danish People’s Party (DF), Finnish True Finns 
(PS), French National Rally (RN), Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), and Swedish Democrats 
(SD) all have centrist to centre-left economic and far-right sociocultural positions, which fits the 
new winning formula thesis (see figure 2.1). The CHES data shows that the old winning formula 
is still used by the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP), the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC), and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as they 
still hold right-wing economic policies and far-right cultural policies. The centre to centre-left 
economic positions of most of the parties is not surprising, as it reflects the adoption of the new 
winning formula that has helped many radical right-wing parties see electoral success in the 21st 
century. 
Figure 2.1  
 
Chart created by the author using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014. 3 
 
3 Despite being one of the case studies for the paper, an Icelandic party is not included in this chart. This is because 
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The use of the new versus the old winning formula is significant because if a party’s position on 
the new cultural divide (gal-tan) were the same as on their traditional left-wing dimension (i.e. 
the old winning formula), then a one-dimensional party system would remain. When the 
positions of a party on both dimensions reinforce each other there may not be an opportunity for 
new parties to emerge. If a party’s positions diverge on the two dimensions, then a more complex 
two-dimensional party system emerges (Bornschier 2010:8). Old cleavages will remain stable if 
the new mobilized cultural cleavages align with the traditional cleavages (Gosselin 2008: 3).  
2.7 Political Opportunity Structure  
The reaction of mainstream parties is part of the ‘political opportunity structure’, which is 
a favourable set of circumstances that help new parties emerge. The favourable circumstances for 
RRWP include the convergence of mainstream party positions and the position of the 
mainstream right-wing party (Spies & Franzmann, 2011), as well as political and electoral 
institutions, and party-specific characteristics like leader charisma (Kriesi et al 2006, 928). 
Kitschelt & McGann (1995: 14) stated that “The fortunes and behaviour of a political party are 
dependent not only on the presence or absence of an electorate close to its party position, but also 
on the strategic interactions of political parties in the competitive system”. The convergence of 
mainstream parties’ positions to the centre on the traditional left-right spectrum is significant 
because it can make it difficult for voters to differentiate between parties. If parties are 
ideologically similar on a political dimension a voter may feel that the parties no longer reflect 
their political views and switch to a new more radical party. The convergence to the centre can 
also depoliticize economic issues and create niches for potential parties on new issues (Spoon & 
Kluver 2019, 1; Bornschier 2012; Grande & Kriese 2012: 19; Rydren 2005: 423; Spies & 
Franzmann 2011).  In some countries’ parties are already divergent, and the mainstream right-
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wing party may fall fairly far right on traditional-communitarian issues (like in the UK) and have 
ownership of issues the far-right would normally address (i.e. immigration, security). This makes 
it more difficult for a radical right-wing party to be successful, as there is less space for the party 
in the competitive space (Bornschier 2010: 14). 
Parties may have some right-wing positions while maintaining more centrist positions 
and these contradicting positions will result in parties maintaining a relatively moderate 
perceived position (Bornschier 2010: 15). In countries where there was no radicalization of the 
left, it is less likely that a right-wing party will have emerged as there would be no bipolar 
opportunity for emergence (Bornschier 2012). If a mainstream right-wing party adopted RRWP 
issues temporarily without a response from the left (like in Germany), then it is likely the RRWP 
will not have survived electorally (Bornschier 2010:22). There is more likely to be space in a 
political system that is two dimensional, so if traditional cleavages (class, economic) still 
dominate then there will fewer opportunities for a new party to establish itself (Bornschier 2012).  
There have been different theories to try to explain mainstream parties’ reaction to the 
electoral success of the radical right, but it is important to consider both the supply side that is 
the parties and the demand side of the electorate. One of the main explanatory factors of the 
success of the radical right and the proliferation of their issues is the mainstream parties’ reaction 
to them. Several authors have put forward different reactions that the parties can have, but in 
general, they agree (in relatively similar wording) that parties can:  ignore, stigmatize/ostracize, 
incorporate/collaborate, or co-opt the RRWP (Akkerman 2015; Bale et al. 2010; Downs 2001; 
Meguid 2005; Minkenberg 2013). Since Downs’ (2001) study is cited by several authors, this 
study will use his definitions: ignoring the party is used to try to delegitimize the RRWP and the 
importance of their issues, this could backfire if voters think the issues are important. 
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Stigmatize/ostracization (which he calls isolation), involves attacking the party through legal or 
formal restrictions like a cordon sanitaire.  Co-optation is a very common reaction where parties 
take the policies that make the RRWP electorally successful, but this strategy could result in the 
loss of moderate supporters. Collaboration or incorporation involves voting on legislation 
together or coalition formation (Downs 2001: 26-28). A more in-depth review of the 
consequences of each of these strategies is outlined below. 
2.7.1. Mainstream Party Cooptation 
Cooptation legitimizes the radical right and their issues and normally results in the 
RRWP policies being implemented (Minkenberg 2013: 5). A successful example of this was the 
cooptation of issues of nationalism and immigration by the mainstream right parties in Flanders, 
Belgium from the Flemish Interest (the RRWP). The mainstream parties managed to co-opt both 
the issues and issue ownership from the RRWP (Pauwels 2011: 60).  Bale (2003) found that 
cooptation and the often-resulting increased salience of immigration and other issues can be 
beneficial to all parties on the right if they are willing to cooperate to use the RRWP votes to 
hold office and pass legislation. If the main left-wing party loses votes to other left-wing parties, 
the RRWP are not a threat to their likelihood of governing. But if they lose votes to the right bloc 
then a right-wing coalition is much more likely making the RRWP a much bigger threat. (Bale et 
al 2010: 411).  
Several works have investigated if cooptation of the policy positions that make RRWP 
popular is happening amongst the mainstream parties of Western Europe. Han (2015) found that 
right-wing parties became more restrictive with regards to their multiculturalism policy when 
RRWP were electorally successful, and the left-wing parties did in certain scenarios too. 
Rooduijn et al (2012) found that there was no increase in populist rhetoric by mainstream parties. 
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Van Spanje (2010) found that in a system where a radical right-wing party was electorally 
successful all parties moved towards more restrictive immigration policy. It also found that other 
parties became more restrictive on immigration when radical right-wing parties were more 
successful. Akkerman (2015) found that between 1995 and 2011 immigration did increase in 
salience in manifestos and that the more successful the radical right-wing party, the more 
rightward mainstream parties moved. The Liberal (centre-right) parties tended to move 
rightward, but the Social Democratic (left-wing) parties and Christian conservatives (centre-right 
to right-wing) remained relatively unfazed ideologically by the radical right (Akkerman 2015, 
60-63) Finally, Wagner & Meyer (2017) found that all parties have moved towards the right on 
the liberal-authoritarian dimension and increased their salience of RRWP issues in manifestos in 
17 countries (98).  Overall, there has been an increase in the salience of issues of the cultural 
dimension in the late 20th century, including content on European integration, law and order, and 
the environment (Green-Pedersen 2007: 615). This indicates that the cooptation of RRWP issues 
and issue positions is happening in many European countries, influencing the electoral success of 
the RRWP. 
2.7.2. Mainstream Party Collaboration 
Collaboration is an increasingly popular mainstream strategy and is most clearly 
illustrated in government coalitions or parliamentary agreement. Naturally, this is likely to pull 
some of the policies of a coalition right-ward, but it can also have a de-polarizing effect on 
RRWP positions. In Sweden and Denmark, the difference in collaborating with the RRWP can 
be at least partially explained by the willingness of smaller centre right-wing parties to 
collaborate with left-wing parties. The mainstream right in Denmark had incentive to work with 
the radical right because the Social Liberals (centre party) were governing with the Social 
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Democrats (centre-left). In Sweden, the large centre-right party was still able to work with the 
centrist Social Liberals, so appealing to the RRWP would have threatened their ability to form a 
centre government (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008: 610; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm 2008: 
378). De Lange (2012) found that collaboration with the RRWP in the form of coalitions is of 
interest to mainstream right parties when they become mathematically/electorally possible as it 
can help them achieve their office seeking goals. De Lange’s work supports the finding that bloc 
politics play a large role in the mainstream right’s reaction to the RRWP in Bale (2003), Green-
Pedersen & Krogstrup (2008), and Green-Pedersen & Odmalm (2008) earlier studies. Some 
studies have found that collaboration and incumbency can have detrimental effects on RRWP 
electoral success, as was seen in Austria (Akkerman & DeLange, 2012; Heinisch 2003) 
2.7.3. Mainstream Party Ostracization 
To ignore or ostracize the radical right, mainstream parties must have a coherent 
message, otherwise, ostracization is likely to fail in stopping RRWP success (Bale et al, 2010: 
421,413; Art 2007: 335; Downs 2001). In other words, all parties must agree to react to the 
RRWP the same way. The most effective ostracization technique is the cordon sanitaire, which 
is an agreement to not cooperate with the RRWP in any form, including parliamentary or 
government-related actions (Coffe 2005: 77). However, there is mixed evidence regarding 
whether complete ostracization works to effectively eliminate the RRWP. Van Spanje & Van der 
Brug (2009) found that the Flemish Interest (radical right-wing party) benefitted from exclusion, 
the Lega Nord (radical right-wing party) would have benefitted if they had been excluded, the 
Danish People’s Party (radical right-wing party)  would not have benefitted, and all other parties 
evaluated in the study would not have been affected electorally at all. Non-cooperation by 
mainstream parties signals that RRWP are seen as illegitimate by all established parties and this 
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action could increase attention to the party (Van Spanje & Van der Brug 2009: 376). In the long 
term, ostracization can be effective if all parties participate, as voters may begin to believe their 
vote for RRWP will never influence policy or result in them forming government (Art 2007: 
335; Van Spanje & Van der Brug 2009: 357).  
If a cordon sanitaire is not possible, the left-wing parties are more likely to maintain 
electoral support if they either maintain their original moderate/left social position or adopt new 
restrictive cultural positions. These options have varied consequences, if they do not hold their 
left-wing position, then they are likely to lose votes to smaller left-wing parties that tend to take a 
strong stance against the RRWP (Bale et al, 2010: 417, 422). If mainstream left parties adopt 
restrictive policies, then they may lose credibility for a lack of policy coherence or purity. 
Cooptation of the issues by either the left or the right also legitimizes the issues in the political 
arena (but not always the party) (Bornschier 2012). Meguid found that many parties initially 
used a dismissive or ignore strategy, but later adopted accommodative restrictive policy or 
polarized more adversarially (2005: 353). 
2.8 Economic Factors  
Initially, it was thought that high unemployment or economic crises fostered an 
opportunity for RRWP to succeed, but several works have disproved this theory. Arzheimer & 
Carter (2006) found that RRWP perform better electorally when the unemployment rate is low 
and suggest that voters may turn to established and economically experienced parties when 
unemployment is high as the economy is likely seen as more important in those circumstances 
(434).  Pauwels (2011, 66) found that in 2009 in Belgium that high unemployment coincided 
with the electoral drop of radical right Flemish Interest which “supports the hypothesis that 
voters prefer parties that have shown competence in employment and socio-economic policies 
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rather than inexperienced populist radical right parties in times of crisis”. Lubbers et al (2002) 
also found a negative relationship between unemployment and RRWP party support, and that 
differences in the unemployment rate across countries did not explain RRWP support. So not 
only was the relationship not significant but it was also negative (364). 
In regard to economic crashes, Stockemer (2017) found that radical right-wing parties are 
more electorally successful in countries that were not hit by the 2008 economic recession, except 
France and Germany. Between 2009 and 2013 the RRWP gained only a “1 percentage [point] 
increase in aggregate average regional vote shore” (1536). There is evidence that immediately 
after banking crashes RRWP do well electorally, but no such effects were found for non-
financial economic shocks or recessions (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 137). 
The RRWP is more likely to find support in prosperous countries. Both Anderson & 
Bjorklund (2008) and Taggart (1995) found that new protest parties have the best political 
conditions for electoral success when there is long term economic success and a strong welfare 
state because the absence of economic problems, like unemployment, allows other issues to be 
important. Generally, countries where RRWP have not been as electorally successful have been 
post-industrial societies that had economic downturns and higher levels of unemployment in the 
1980s and 1990s (Rydgren, 2005: 415). Mudde’s prediction that “the economic crisis has slowed 
down their electoral growth, by returning the political debate to socioeconomic rather than 
sociocultural issues, there are good reasons to believe that the post-crisis era could see a 
resurgence of PRRPs” (2013: 15), seems to have been accurate with a surge of RRWP support 
across Europe in the most recent national elections. These studies support the idea that when 
economic issues are not pressing politically, RRWP are more likely to be successful, as the 
importance of cultural issues and economic issues could be changing for voters and parties. 
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By touching on literature from various fields, it is evident that many different factors go 
into the electoral success or failure of parties. The theories presented on issue salience in political 
party rhetoric, mainstream party reactions to new challenger parties, and political behaviour, 
have influenced the hypotheses and arguments around issue competition in public opinion and 
party competition and radical right-wing party success that guide this paper. Each set of literature 
touches on issues and the radical right in some way,  like the key issues that influence party 
ideology, attitudes on certain issues which are attributed to a ‘typical’ radical right voter, the 
issues that define the new cultural dimension and new cleavages, the competing pressures of 
issues and their positions, and finally party issue competition. Issues have come up and stood out 
as a relevant factor of importance across various studies but their relationship with radical right-
wing parties has yet to be investigated, except for some work by Green-Pedersen (Green-
Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm, 2008; Green-Pedersen & Otjes 2017), 
but these have been limited to an investigation of party literature.  
The most obvious gap in the literature is the lack of work looking at issue importance in 
public opinion, an area that could help explain political behaviour and party success in different 
countries. Though the work looking at issues salience in party manifestos has been established, it 
is worth updating it based on the more recent elections that are discussed in this study. There 
have been no studies on issue salience in Norwegian, Finnish, or Icelandic party manifestos 
using Comparative Manifesto data or using CSES data (at least in English). This means that there 
has been no real investigation into the issues that were most important in the party manifestos or 
public opinion during the two elections where the FrP won more than 20% of the vote share or 
when PS drastically increased its vote share by fifteen percentage points. The inclusion of data 
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on issue salience in public opinion and party rhetoric will bring together the two areas of 



















4 Spoon & Kluver, 2019 did a large-N study that used both public opinion and manifesto data to investigate vote 
switching to non-mainstream parties, which by definition included radical right parties. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
The research question driving this paper asks why radical right-wing parties succeed 
electorally in some countries but fail to have much of an electoral impact in others. To try to 
answer this question I put forward the argument that there is a relationship between changing 
economic and cultural issue salience and radical right-wing party electoral success. Both parties 
and the public as a whole can find certain issues important, party rhetoric and public opinion can 
certainly be quantified to give an idea of exactly which issues are at the top of parties’ agendas 
and the front of voters’ minds, and how this translates into vote choice. Since this study looks at 
both the parties’ issue salience and issue salience in public opinion it will require more than one 
kind of data and analysis. This chapter will discuss case selection, then explain the data and 
methods used to measure and evaluate party issue salience and the survey data on public opinion 
used to try to explain political behaviour that leads to radical right-wing party success.  
3.1 Case Selection 
The selection of cases that will be investigated was limited by the data availability of 
public opinion surveys. Party manifesto data is easily accessible from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project, but comparable cross-national public opinion data is harder to find. The 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provided the best data to compare public 
opinion and vote choice for this study. Forty-one countries participated in the CSES Module that 
included relevant questions on issues of importance, Module Three (discussed in more detail in 
section 3.3). For the study, it is beneficial to look at European countries that had more than one 
election during this period, that way we can see if there is any change in issue salience in party 
manifestos, public opinion, and electoral success of parties. In the period Module Three covers, 
2006 to 2011, seven European countries had two elections, these were Czech Republic, Finland, 
39 
Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland. Unfortunately, Germany and Poland 
did not provide data for the two relevant issue importance variables/questions in both elections, 
so that leaves the following five countries with available data for the two variables - Czech 
Republic, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Norway. The similarities between Finland, 
Iceland, and Norway are suitable for a Most Similar System Design (MSSD), as they all share 
similar histories, sociocultural, and socioeconomic characteristics, the Netherlands also shares 
many of the key characteristics typical of Northern European countries (though it is significantly 
more multicultural). Though the Czech Republic would be an interesting case, there are 
significant differences in the political culture of post-communist states and non-communist 
Western European countries, including the institutionalization of democracy, democratic 
backsliding, economic differences, and pre-existing strong nationalism, that make it difficult to 
include the country in an MSSD. For this reason, the Czech Republic will not be included in the 
study. To strengthen the MSSD only the three Nordic case studies will be used. Therefore, the 
case studies chosen include Finland, Iceland, and Norway. 
The election studies that the CSES collected data for are from the following years:  
Finland in 2007 and 2011, Iceland in 2007 and 2009, and Norway in 2005 and 2009. Each of 
these countries offers a different example of the electoral success of a radical right party which 
makes them optimal for comparison. Firstly, The Finnish case shows a drastic increase in the 
radical right Finns Party (formerly True Finns) (PS) electoral success between 2007 in 2011, 
where it increased its vote share by 15 percentage points (Statistics Finland, Parliamentary 
Elections - Tables). PS went from the eighth biggest party in parliament to the third biggest. For 
the Finnish case, it is expected that there will be an increase in the salience of cultural issues 
from 2007 to 2011 that corresponds with its increased electoral success.  The radical right 
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Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) had less than a percentage point change between the 2005 and 
2009 elections, retaining its place as the second biggest party in parliament and the party of the 
opposition. In this study, they are the case of an institutionalized and ‘mainstream’ party due to 
its vote share being similar to that of the mainstream parties. I would expect to see cultural issues 
be salient in both elections. Finally, there is the Icelandic case, where there was no radical right-
wing party in either the 2007 and 2009 election (this was also the case in the 2003 and 2013 
elections). It is predicted that Iceland will have low saliency of cultural issues in both elections.  
Since each of these countries has a multiparty system there are too many parties to 
analyze every party that competed in the relevant elections. Therefore, the most electorally 
successful mainstream left-wing party and right-wing party of each party system will be looked 
at in addition to the radical right-wing parties. The Norwegian Centre for Research Data has 
compiled parliamentary election results from 1990 onwards. Table 3.1 lists the names of the 
parties that will be studied from each country, with the party names (in English and the country’s 
native language) and abbreviations. Using Ennser’s (2012) categorization of party families, the 
parties from each family were chosen based on their electoral success in the two elections 
between 2006 and 2011. Based on the country case selections, the study will look at eight 
different political parties for a total of six elections between 2006 and 2011. 
 Table 3.1. Case Study Parties by Country 
Country Centre-Left Party Centre-Right Party Far-Right Party 
Finland Social Democratic Party of Finland 
(Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolu) 
(SDP) 











Norway Norwegian Labour Party (Det Norske 
Arbeiderparti) (DNA) 





3.2 Party Issue Salience 
Based on the literature on party issue salience and positions, party issue salience is most 
effectively analyzed by using data collected through text analysis. According to Spies & 
Franzmann (2011) party positions and issues can be studied using data from mass surveys, expert 
survey data, or manifesto data. Mass surveys give researchers data on positions and issue 
importance through the mass public’s perception of the parties, which is useful when trying to 
analyze how voters choose between parties. Mass cross-national surveys are unlikely to ask 
questions specifically about the issue salience of national political parties. This makes mass 
surveys difficult to use when trying to measure issue salience for parties. Expert survey data like 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey has also been used to measure both position and salience in a 
number of studies (Inglehart & Norris 2019; Lubbers et al 2002; Meyer & Wagner 2018; Rovny 
& Polk, 2019; Wagner 2012). Though country expert data can give an informed opinion on party 
positioning and issue salience, the CHES data, unfortunately, does not use consistent questions in 
each survey and does not include the same countries in every survey. This makes the CHES data 
difficult to use if one wants to do a longitudinal study. Benoit and Laver’s (2007) expert survey 
only has one time point, so it is not optimal for comparative studies. In some cases, authors have 
used content analysis in the form of coded newspaper media to analyze salience and issue 
positions (Bornschier, 2012; Bornschier, 2015; Kriesi et al 2006; Rennwald & Evans, 2014), but 
this would be difficult without a firm grasp of the language of every country that is studied. 
Content analysis using manifesto data is, for this study, the most effective option and is 
the most popular form of data to use when looking at salience in party discourse (Akkerman, 
2015; De Lange, 2007; Dolezal et al, 2014; Dolezal et al, 2016; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Green-
Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008; Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2015; Green-Pedersen & Otjes, 
2017; Harmel & Svasand, 1997; Lehmann & Zobel, 2018;  Meguid 2005; Spies & Franzmann, 
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2011, Spoon & Kluver, 2019; Wagner 2012; Wagner & Meyer 2017). Manifestos (in some 
countries called election programs or platforms) are official documents produced by parties or 
election coalitions used to outline their policy positions when they compete in national elections 
(Werner et al. 2019). Manifesto data is optimal because it uses official party documents to 
generate issue salience and policy positions. The Comparative Manifesto Project, now called 
Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR), has collected manifestos from the 
mid-twentieth century onward and is constantly updating the dataset with new manifesto data 
using a consistent coding scheme and issue categories.  
MARPOR provides both the original manifestos and a coded dataset based on the 
salience of issues. MARPOR codes both positive and negative statements to make it possible to 
derive positions from the dataset and more specific value-based statements. Manifestos are coded 
for parties in each national lower house election if they have won at least one seat (Volkens et al. 
2019). The Manifesto Project trains coders to code the manifestos, looking to answer the 
question “What message is the party/presidential candidate trying to convey to voters? Which are 
the issues the party/presidential candidate regards as important?” (Werner et al. 2019). The 
manifestos body text is coded (none of the chapter or section headings are coded) into quasi-
sentences. A quasi-sentence is normally one sentence but can also be different parts of a single 
sentence if the parts of the sentence are unrelated or have two distinct statements, but a quasi-
sentence never consists of two or more sentences (Werner et al 2019: 6).  
The Manifesto Project divides these quasi sentences into seven policy areas, with 56 
different categories, each representing a unique issue (see Appendix A), and in some cases 
subcategories (sub-issues) (Werner et al 2019: 7).  These categories can be divided into 
economic and non-economic issues, which was done by Spies & Franzmann (2011) (see 
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Appendix A). Of the 56 categories, 32 are noneconomic and 24 are economic. To calculate the 
amount of salience parties give to economic compared to non-economic issues one can use the 
total percentage of sentences devoted to each category.  
For this study, any issue that comprised five percent or more of a manifesto will be 
considered one of importance to the party. Five percent has been chosen as the threshold because 
few issues make up more than 5% of a manifesto, as most receive between zero and four percent 
(Volkens et al, 2018). This finding is confirmed by Lehmann & Zobel (2018) who state that most 
categories are around or below 5%, so any issue with more than 5% is one with a rather high 
saliency (1071). For this reason, it can be assumed that an issue that has comprised more than 
5% of a manifesto is one that is important and salient to a party. 
Based on the review of previous studies, it is clear that RRWP experience the most 
electoral success when every mainstream party adopts issues that the RRWP addresses. For this 
reason, it is necessary to look at not only the issue content of the RRWP manifestos but also the 
mainstream right-wing party and left-wing parties. Using the coded MARPOR data, issues will 
be divided into economic and sociocultural categories to compare overall manifesto content and 
all individual issues will be ranked for each party to see if the same issues are salient between 
parties.  
3.3 Public Opinion 
There is a symbiotic relationship between the salience of issues in the public and within 
party discourse. Identifying the importance of different issues in the public can help explain how 
salient cultural issues are in modern politics. The most appropriate measure of issue salience in 
the public for this study is through public opinion surveys. For each case, national election 
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surveys will be used both to look broadly at which issues were salient to the public and to run 
multivariate analyses on which variables affected vote choice in each election.  
The two most accessible methods of assessing public opinion on national political issues 
are through National Election Studies or Eurobarometer data. National Election Studies often ask 
the question “What is the most important issue facing the country presently?” or some close 
variation. The studies also often ask “What is the most important issue for the voting decision?”, 
which is an even more valuable question, especially when trying to look at priming. Both of 
these questions will offer valuable information on which issues voters perceive to be the most 
important in the country and which most influence their vote. There are some issues with using 
national election studies for comparative studies. Some countries in Europe have done election 
studies for decades and offer easy access to the data (including Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, 
Norway), but some of them provide no codebook in English (i.e. Switzerland). Other European 
countries have only recently started doing National Election Studies (France, Austria) and some 
have sporadic election studies that have not been done systematically (Belgium). Given these 
factors, the use of National Election Studies can be difficult. However, the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) has created a common set of questions that have harmonized some 
national election studies. 
The CSES has created a collaborative comparative election survey. Participating 
countries and volunteer researchers use a common set of questions developed by a committee of 
scholars which are included in cross-national post-election studies. The data from the national 
election studies are then translated into English and combined into a single dataset. CSES has 
done four modules so far, the first covers elections from 1996-2001, Module Two 2001-2006, 
Module Three 2006-2011, and Module Four 2011-2016. Each module focuses on a different 
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theme, so some questions do not exist in every module. This limits the use of the data 
longitudinally. Module Three (2006-2011) has compiled relevant data as the focus of the study 
was on voters’ perceptions and responses to political choices in an election. In its questionnaire 
two questions are asked that are pertinent to this study, each of them is open-ended, meaning 
respondents were free to answer however they please, these answers were then coded by the 
collaborators of each country and translated into English (if necessary). The first ‘egocentric’ 
question asks: “What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election?” 
(C3001_1) (questionnaire Q1a) they also ask a follow-up question which asks for the second 
most important issue (See Appendix B for question and explanation) (Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems). They then ask a ‘sociotropic’ question: “What do you think is the most 
important political problem facing [COUNTRY] today?” (C3002_1) (questionnaire Q2a.) (See 
Appendix B for question and explanation) (ibid). From this point on egocentric will be referred 
to as the personal level question and sociotropic will be referred to as the country level. These 
two questions will provide the attitudinal data needed to evaluate issue salience in the public.  
These national election surveys also offer the opportunity to run multivariate analyses to 
assess the impact of these personal and country level questions on party vote choice in 
parliamentary elections. This way the actual influence of issue salience and other variables on 
vote choice can be analyzed. All variables were coded by the author into dummy variables and 
all models used logistic multivariate analysis.5  For the multivariate analysis models on vote 
choice in Finland and Norway, there are nine total independent variables - three partisanship 
variables, the age variable (Aged Over 50), gender variable (Female), education level variable 
(Post-Secondary Education), personal level issue salience (Personal Level Salience), the country 
 
5 For a detailed description of the coding of variables see Appendix J. 
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level issue salience (Country Level Salience), and right-wing ideological stance (Right-Wing). 
The Iceland models have a total of eight independent variables as only two parties are included 
in the model, so there is one less partisanship variable. 
The paper is divided into three country cases, for each case, there will be a review of 
secondary literature to frame the political culture, history, and competition. There will then be a 
quantitative analysis of the manifesto content of the relevant three (or two in the case of Iceland) 
parties and then a quantitative analysis of the two public opinion questions from CSES for each 













Chapter 4: Finland 
Compared to the other RRWP in Northern Europe, the emergence and electoral success of the 
True Finns Party (PS)6 was rather late. PS was formed in the 1990s and its big increase in vote 
share did not occur until the 2011 national election. Between the 2007 and 2011 national 
election, PS managed to increase its vote share by over fifteen percentage points. A remarkable 
jump in electoral support for a fringe party in national politics. The 2011 election was a 
breakthrough election where PS drastically increased its vote share while every other party 
decreased its vote share. Looking at the salience of issues may help explain how the PS went 
from a relatively minor party to one of the biggest parties in parliament in one election. PS’ 
unique history differs from other Nordic RRWP as it emerged later, but its success came faster 
than that of other parties. Its surge in electoral success makes it a case worth investigating to see 
if issues of the radical right have established themselves in Finnish political party rhetoric or the 
public's political agenda. For the Finnish case, I expect the sociocultural dimension and its issues 
to be more salient in the 2011 election than in the 2007 election. 
The PS is the newest radical right party in the Nordic region, and it has a distinct party 
history within the party family in the region. Unlike the Norwegian and Danish RRWP, the True 
Finns did not emerge as a tax populist party in the 1970s. The True Finns Party was established 
in 1995 and was created as a de facto successor of the Finnish Rural Party (SMP). There is some 
debate that the PS is not a radical right-wing party, but based on the party’s policy positions, 
which are socioeconomically centrist and sociocultural authoritarian, along with its populist 
political style and cross-national ties to other radical right-wing party in the European 
 
6 Since 2011 the party has changed its English name to The Finns or The Finns Party. Since the party was called The 
True Finns during the time period discussed this name will be used. 
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Parliament, it has been considered a RRWP in several studies (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008; 
Arter 2010; Jungar & Jupskas 2014; Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund 2014; Widfeldt 2018).  
Public opinion data, manifesto data, and election results in Finland allow for direct 
analysis of changes in issue salience and far-right electoral success from 2007 to 2011. To 
provide context to the evaluation of this primary data, this chapter will first go over the historical 
background of the PS and its success up to 2007, typical PS voters, and the electoral system in 
Finland. This will be followed by a quantitative analysis of the issue salience in the major party 
manifestos using MARPOR data and then in public opinion from the Finnish National Election 
Study through the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.  
4.1 History of the True Finns 
 The Finnish Rural Party (SMP), the ‘predecessor’ of the True Finns, was formed in 1959 
to try and represent the ‘forgotten people’ (forgotten by the ruling government), and the ‘small 
man’ in the country (Arter 2010: 486).  The Finnish Rural Party, as the name suggests, was an 
agrarian party with populist, anti-establishment, left-leaning social populist, and right-wing 
traditionalist social beliefs (Arter 2012: 815).  The SMP attracted support among dissatisfied 
citizens, low-income citizens, and other groups who later continued to support the PS, though 
SMP did not ever address immigration as a political issue (Kestila 2006: 174). Changes in 
Finnish society, specifically industrialization and a move away from agriculture to the tertiary 
sector, led to the party's dwindling electoral support. In 1995 SMP went bankrupt and was 
disbanded. One of the major reasons a radical right party did not emerge earlier in Finland is 
because of the need to remain on good terms with the Soviet Union until its fall in 1991. After 
the Second World War a political consensus against right-wing policies was formed, the most 
relevant being around foreign policy and Fenno-Soviet relations. In addition, Finland signed two 
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agreements that forbid all overt fascist activity – the Moscow Armistice in 1944 that ended the 
Continuation War against the Soviet Union and the Treat of Paris in 1947 for Finland’s role as an 
Axis co-belligerent in WWII (Kestila 2006: 171). 
Whether the PS is simply a continuation of the Finnish Rural Party is questionable, 
especially when looking at its modern-day core supporters and policy positions. However, the 
founders of PS were all previously members of the SMP (Kestila 2006:174). One of PS’ 
founders, Timo Soini, became the party leader of the True Finns in 1997 was the deputy chair of 
the SMP from 1989 to 1992 and the SMP party secretary from 1992 to 1995. In the 1999 
election, the first PS competed in, 39% of candidates had previously run as SMP candidates 
(Arter 2012: 813). Despite PS’ historical roots being in the SMP, the party, its candidates, and its 
issue positions have evolved to a point where the PS is distinct from its ‘predecessor’. Unlike the 
SMP, PS does not rely solely on support from rural areas or the agrarian population. Compared 
to other modern RRWP whose success may be hindered by a negative connection to an older 
neo-fascist party or movement, having ties to an agrarian party does not have the same kind of 
social pariah status. 
In 1999 the PS competed in its first parliamentary election and it received just under 1% 
of the vote share, four years later in 2003 it received 1.57%. Its electoral success jumped to 
4.05% in 2007 and then its results increased fourfold receiving 19.04% in 2011 (see Figure 4.1). 
This drastic increase in vote share is one of the reasons the party is so interesting, as its electoral 
success was not gradual, but rather drastic. Since this uptick, its vote share has remained 
relatively high with it receiving 17.65% in 2015 and 17.5% in 2019 (Statistics Finland – 





Chart created by the author using data from the Norwegian Centre for Research Data’s European Election 
Database and Statistics Finland. 
 
The party elected three MPs in 2003, five in 2007, and in 2011 the party won thirty-nine 
seats. This resulted in the party going from being the smallest party in parliament to the third 
biggest (based on seat distribution) with the second-highest vote share, increasing its seat share 
eightfold (Arter 2012: 814; Nurmi & Nurmer 2011: 236). The jump in electoral success between 
2007 and 2011 is the largest electoral gain by any party in Finland ever, based on both seat share 
and vote share (Arter 2013: 99). When looking at the electoral results of the parties that 
competed in the 2011 election, the PS is the only party to have increased its electoral results from 
the 2007 election, and it increased its vote share in every district in mainland Finland7 (Nurmi & 
Nurmi 2011: 236). The Centre Party had the biggest loss in vote share, with a decrease of just 
over seven percentage points and a loss of seats in eleven of fourteen districts (Nurmi & Nurmi 
 
7 Mainland Finland excludes the autonomous Aland Island. 
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2011: 236). The National Coalition Party lost nearly two percentage points of its vote share and 
the Social Democratic party decreased its vote share by just over two points. In an election where 
every other party was a loser in its vote share, the PS came out a winner and the reasons behind 
this are of particular interest to this paper. 
The academic assessment of PS policy positions and manifesto content suggests that the 
party has evolved over the fifteen years of its existence. The party always held traditional 
fundamentalist beliefs related to sociocultural issues. The party is against changes in society that 
affect the ‘moral base of Finnish society’, specifically criticizing liberal attitudes that threaten the 
‘traditional family’ and Christian values (Arter 2010: 497). Before 2007, the party addressed 
traditionalism, moralism, law and order, Euroscepticism, and religion, and targeted pensioners, 
the farming and rural population, and entrepreneurs and small businesses (Widfeldt 2000: 493). 
It was not until 2007 that the PS dedicated a whole section of its manifesto to immigration and 
asylum policy, with a focus on acculturation and mono-culturalism (Arter 2010: 498). All of 
these issues and the groups they are aimed at are common to the RRWP and continue to be 
salient to the party, but before 2007 there was an absence of the issues of immigration and 
multiculturalism. Due partly to its roots as an agrarian party, the PS has maintained moderately 
left-wing positions on economic issues. Its dual left-wing economic and right-wing sociocultural 
position was always fitting to the new winning formula of RRWP. 
The electorate that supports the PS is similar to the profile of RRWP supporters across 
Europe that have been described in many other studies. PS voters hold very strong anti-
immigrant attitudes, and in 2007 the supporters were predominantly male, working-class, had 
low levels of education, were under 44 years of age (Kestila 2006: 169) and the party had high 
levels of support amongst the lower-middle class, farmers, small entrepreneurs, and the urban 
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working and lower class (Nurmi & Nurmi 2011:235). In Finland, similar to all other Nordic 
countries, the most significant indicator of RRWP support is attitudes about immigration 
(Widfeldt 2018: 16). Alongside anti-immigrant attitudes, PS supporters tend to be distinctly 
opposed to the EU (ibid). In 2007, 53.5% of PS voters were working class, this was the highest 
percentage of support from this class of any party (Arter 2010, 501). In the 2011 election, 27% of 
PS voters had voted for the Social Democrats in 2007 and 14% had not voted. This is in line with 
the theory that working-class left-wing voters realign to RRWP and of the RRWP talent of 
motivating previous non-voters (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund 2014: 657).  
A study by Kestilä found that the Finnish public desires strict immigration policy (but not 
refugee policy), views immigrants as a threat to cultural cohesion, and feels they may weaken the 
national economy (2006: 183).  Compared to Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, Finland held 
significantly more anti-immigrant attitudes. However, the existence of anti-immigrant attitudes 
does not necessarily result in an electorally successful RRWP. Kestila (2006: 184) showed that 
the Germans and the French hold the most extreme anti-immigrant attitudes, but Germany did 
not have a successful RRWP for decades and the National Rally in France remains largely a 
fringe party, especially in parliamentary elections. Though other countries that have negative 
attitudes towards immigrants like Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands do have successful to 
moderately successful RRWP, so Finland could fit into either group. 
4.2. The Finnish Party and Electoral System 
 The political opportunity structure in Finland began to open up in the late 1990s and early 
2000s due to several changes in the political arena. Sociocultural issues began to be more salient 
in the early 1990s, with the accession of Finland to the EU in 1994 opening up a new area for 
parties to take positions on. This particular topic highlighted centre-periphery tensions and issues 
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of national interest and sovereignty (Arter 2010: 486). By the early 2000s, consensus politics was 
becoming the norm in Finland and coalition governments had been growing. The two cabinets 
between 1995 and 2003 consisted of five different parties from across the political spectrum 
(Arter 2010: 487). The growing coalition of parties likely moved many of the government parties 
towards the centre and limited the political options of voters. This would open up the edges of 
the political spectrum for more radical parties.  
PS’ profile was raised in 2006 during the country’s presidential election when the party 
leader, Timo Soini, ran as a candidate. Though he only won 2.8% of votes, his participation in 
the race attracted media interest and attention to him and the party (Arter 2010: 489). Soini’s 
rhetoric was anti-elite, anti-intellectual, and anti-consensus, and criticized the recent rainbow 
coalitions as being anti-democratic, arguing there were no longer real political alternatives in the 
Finnish political arena (Arter 2010: 489). The 2009 European Parliamentary election was the 
first election where immigration was a major issue of debate and PS took 9.8% of the vote share 
in this election (Rannanpää 2010: 78, 81). Following the electoral success at the European 
election, in the 2011 national parliamentary election, the PS manifesto had developed a strong 
mix of Euroscepticism and cultural nationalism (Arter 2012: 816). The PS has been particularly 
successful at reframing the welfare state in sociocultural terms, focusing on the threat of 
immigrants and the EU threatening sovereignty over the Finnish welfare state (Nordensvard & 
Ketola 2015: 356).  In 2011, Timo Soini’s experience as a Member of the European Parliament 
from 2009 to 2011 helped highlight European issues as they relate to Finnish national politics 
(Nurmi & Nurmi 2011: 236). These things together throughout the early 2000s provided an 
opportunity for the emergence of a new party in the Finnish party system. 
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The type of electoral system a country uses will also affect the electoral success of 
political parties. Finnish national parliamentary elections use an open-list proportional 
representation system.  Each district elects a different number of representatives depending on 
the constituency’s population and those elected can be a mix of candidates from different parties 
(Nurmi & Nurmi 2011: 235). Parties can run a maximum of fourteen candidates in each of 
Finland’s fourteen mainland electoral districts (Arter 2013: 102; Elections Finland 2019). The 
district magnitude ranges from seven in Lapland to thirty-five in the constituency of Uusimaa 
(this excludes the autonomous Province of Aland, which acts as the fifteenth district and elects 
one representative) (Statistics Finland – Parliamentary elections, quality description).  In open-
list systems, candidates play an important role and the PS used this to its advantage by finding 
charismatic candidates and those already known to the public. 
The party has seen electoral success in the open-list system in part due to the use of high-
profile electoral candidates.  In 2003, the party had Tony ‘the Viking’ Halme, a professional 
boxer, wrestler, and media personality, with a habit of making racist and homophobic comments, 
run on the party list. In the election, Halme received the fifth highest nominal vote in the country 
(Arter 2013: 108). In 2007, Pertti ‘Veltto’ Virtanen, a former rock musician, was elected to 
parliament as a PS party member. Virtanen held the seat from 2007 to 2015 (Arter 2013: 108). 
Other PS members that were famous outside of politics before being elected include Rita 
Tuulikki ‘Kike’ Elomaa, a former bodybuilding champion and pop singer (elected in 2011), 
Veera Ruoho a former Olympic taekwondo practitioner (elected in 2015, defected in 2017), and 
Juha Vaatainen a former professional athlete (in parliament from 2011-2015). In the 2007 
election, the party had only moderate success in its total vote share, but it had several high 
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profile and successful candidates. In 2003 along with Halme’s success, party leader Timo Soini 
received the third-highest share of individual votes in the country (Arter 2013: 108).  
 In the 2011 election, most candidates that ran on the PS list had no previous 
parliamentary experience or name recognition. In fact, 80% of PS candidates had not run in 
parliamentary elections before (Arter 2013: 109). The party did, however, field many candidates. 
The PS fielded as many candidates as the Social Democrats, historically the biggest party in 
Finland, and more than six of the other seven parliamentary parties (there were nine 
parliamentary parties at the time) (Arter 2013: 110). Along with its 15 percentage point increase 
in vote share, the party increased total votes and seat share in all fourteen mainland 
constituencies. Despite having an inexperienced group of candidates, the party was successful in 
electing a large number of seats partly through the success of individual candidates receiving 
large amounts of votes, and the favourability of the distribution of seats in the open-list system.  
4.3. Issue Salience  
 Largely absent in the literature (at least in English) that looks at the True Finns is any 
discussion of issue salience or priming. The goal of the following data analysis is to see whether 
sociocultural issues and issues favourable to RRWP became salient in Finland and if that 
influenced the increase in PS vote share in the 2011 election. The purpose of this section is to 
look at what exactly the public and political parties emphasized during the election period to see 
what issues were primed and if they influence the electoral success of PS. This will be done 
using quantitative analysis of data from a) party manifestos of the three main parties, and b) 
election surveys. The coding of manifestos was done as part of the Comparative Manifesto 
Project, and each of the party manifestos from the Finnish elections had between 97% and 100% 
of quasi sentences successfully coded (meaning almost all text in the manifestos was assigned to 
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a category). The public opinion data was collected as part of the Finnish Election Study and the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, in 2007 there were 1,283 respondents and in 2011 there 
were 1,298. Using the manifesto data, I have ranked the most salient issues overall, including 
any issues that received more than 5% of manifesto content (threshold justified in Methods 
chapter). I have also grouped issues into two groups based on the policy dimensions, economic 
and sociocultural, to compare overall manifesto content of each dimension.  
For public opinion I have done the same, ranking the most common most important 
issues given in surveys and then categorizing them to compare the salience of issues from each 
dimension, and also by party voted for. Finally, there will be multivariate analyses of vote choice 
using public opinion data. This will hopefully give us an idea of whether economic or 
sociocultural issues are more salient in manifesto content and public opinion and looking at 
individual issues will offer more information on election specific or country-specific issues. The 
section will begin by evaluating manifesto content and then look at public opinion data.  
4.3.1. Issue Salience in Party Literature 
 It is important to see whether parties favour economic or social issues in their official 
documents as the manifesto content is likely to guide their electoral strategies. As expected for a 
radical right-wing party, the PS favour sociocultural issues over economic issues in both the 
2007 and 2011 election. Interestingly though it is much more focused on sociocultural issues in 
2007 than in 2011, decreasing from 68% to 56% of manifesto content, a decrease in sociocultural 
content by about 12% (See figures 4.2 and 4.3). What is even more interesting is the content that 
comprises the manifestos of the Social Democrats (SDP) and the National Coalition Party (Kok), 
because we know that the reaction of mainstream parties can affect the success of the radical 
right. In 2007, both of these parties’ manifestos were made up of more than 57% economic 
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issues, but by 2011 these parties’ manifesto content went in diverging directions. In 2011, the 
SDP’s economic manifesto content has increased from 57% to 84% and Kok swayed in favour of 
sociocultural issues, but only slightly more than economic issues, increasing from 42% to 47%. 
The SDP manifesto content suggests a strategy of ignoring the RRWP by avoiding cultural 
issues, which had been predominant in the PS’s manifesto in the previous election making up 
68% of the content. Kok’s move towards cultural issues could suggest a reaction of co-optation, 
not necessarily of a radical policy position but at least of the policy issues, as the party could be 




 This focus on cultural issues by Kok and PS is especially interesting considering this 
election was not long after the European financial crisis (it will be shown later that EU bailout 
funds were a high priority to Finnish voters in 2011). The election campaign focused on the 
financial bailout arrangement in the European Union to rescue the Greek, Irish, and Portuguese 
economies, and PS was a vocal opponent of the bailout measures (Nurmi & Nurmi 2011: 236)  
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Despite the timing of this election, the fact that two of the three biggest parties chose to focus on 
cultural issues more than economic issues shows that the priorities of major parties swung away 
from economic issues, even if only slightly, and did not necessarily line up with the issues salient 




 Looking at the exact issues the parties focus on will help illustrate which cultural issues 
became more salient and if they were related to the far-right. This is especially relevant when 
looking at Kok, seeing as it increased its cultural manifesto content. In 2007, Kok’s most salient 
issues were Welfare State Expansion at 22% and Labour Groups (positive) at 13%, both of these 
are economic issues, though the cultural issues of Environmental Protection, Equality (positive), 








Table 4.1 Kok Manifesto Issue Salience  
 2007 % 2011 % 
Economic  Welfare State Expansion 22.222 Economic Orthodoxy 10.5 
 Labour Groups: Positive 13.333 Welfare State Expansion 10 
 Welfare State Limitation 5.556 Labour Groups: Positive 8.75 
 Incentives: Positive 5   
Sociocultural Environmental Protection 6.667 Civic Mindedness: Positive 19.25 
 Equality: Positive 6.667 Political Authority 6.25 
 Education Expansion 5.556 Environmental Protection 5.25 
 
For Kok in 2011 Civic Mindedness (positive) was the most salient issue at 19%, followed 
by Economic Orthodoxy at 10.5%, Environmental Protection and Political Authority both make 
up more than 5%, Welfare State Expansion dropped by 12% and Labour Groups (positive) 
dropped by just under 5%. Civic Mindedness is defined as “appeals for national solidarity and 
the need for society to see itself as united. Calls for solidarity with and help for fellow people, 
familiar and unfamiliar” this includes positive mentions of civil society, denouncing anti-social 
attitudes, support for public-spiritedness and public interest (Manifesto Codebook 2019). It is 
difficult to determine how an increase in this issue category relates to the RRWP, but it could 
relate to anti-elite sentiments espoused by the RRWP about the ruling parties.  
 In 2007, the PS manifesto had Welfare State Expansion as the most salient issue at 15%, 
but the next seven most salient issues were all sociocultural and together they made up over 37% 
of the manifesto (see table 4.2). The top issues included European Community (negative), 
Multiculturalism (negative), Military (positive), Democracy, and National Way of Life 
(positive), all of these are key RRWP issues, especially National Way of Life (positive). This 
issue category could also be called ‘nationalism’ as it includes “Favourable mentions of the 
manifesto country’s nation, history, and general appeals to” patriotism, and nationalism and 
encouraging pride of citizenship (Manifesto Codebook 2019).  In 2011 National Way of Live 
became the most salient issue in the PS manifesto making up just over 10%. In 2011 more issues 
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are above the four percent threshold of significance, with Agriculture and Farmers and Welfare 
Expansion coming in as the second and third most important issues at around 10% and 9% 
respectively. Core issues of Democracy, Law and Order (positive), Multiculturalism (negative), 
and European Community (negative) remain salient. The appeal to Farmers and Agriculture 
seems natural for the PS given its history, it is also not unusual for a radical right-wing party to 
appeal to this group because they are often classified as self-employed/small business owners 
who are statistically more likely to support RRWP according to previous research (Arzheimer & 
Carter 2006; Betz 1993; Ivarsflaten 2005; Lubbers et al 2002; Taggart 1995). Though Welfare 
State Expansion is categorized as an economic issue, depending on how it is discussed it could 
be framed culturally. Since the PS falls into the category of RRWP the use of the new winning 
formula through discussion of the expansion of the welfare state is in line with the party values 
and left-wing economic positions.  
Table 4.2. PS Manifesto Issue Salience 
 2007 % 2011 % 
Economic Welfare State Expansion 15.094 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive 10.182 
   Welfare State Expansion 9.643 
   Market Regulation 5.732 
   Governmental and Administrative 
Efficiency 
5.125 
   Technology and Infrastructure: Positive 5.057 
Sociocultural European Union: Negative 10.978 National Way of Life: Positive 10.452 
 Equality: Positive 7.719 Democracy 6.676 
 Multiculturalism: Negative 5.146 Law and Order: Positive 5.327 
 
 The SDP’s top issues are heavily skewed economic in both elections, with the two issue 
categories of Welfare State Expansions and Labour Groups (positive) together making up almost 
35% of the manifesto, though the cultural issues of Internationalism (positive), Equality 
(positive), and Environmental Protection all received about 5% of manifesto space in 2007 (see 
Table 4.3). In 2011, the top five issues are economic, together they make up more than 50% of 
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the manifesto. The issues discussed by the SDP are typical of a Social Democratic Party in a 
traditional economic focused party system (see table 4.3). 
Table 4.3. SDP Manifesto Issue Salience 
 2007 % 2011 % 
Economic Welfare State Expansion 18.342 Labour Groups: Positive 15.412 
 Labour Groups: Positive 16.834 Economic Orthodoxy 11.033 
 Technology and 
Infrastructure: Positive 
11.307 Technology and Infrastructure: 
Positive 
10.508 
   Economic Goals 8.932 
   Economic Growth: Positive 8.757 
   Governmental and Administrative 
Efficiency 
6.655 
Sociocultural Education Expansion 6.03   
 Internationalism: Positive 5.276   
 Equality: Positive 5.025   
 
 Overall the issues covered by the main three parties have not unanimously moved to 
sociocultural issues. PS does lean towards sociocultural issues in its manifesto and more recently 
Kok does as well, but the Social Democrats have moved towards a stronger focus on economic 
issues. 
4.3.2. Public Opinion 
Now that we have looked at issues the parties find important, it is necessary to see if the 
issues are reflected in the public. In the manifesto content we have seen that the PS favours 
sociocultural issues, the SDP favours economic issues, and Kok is relatively evenly split 
favouring different dimensions in each of the elections. A cursory glance at the public opinion 
data shows that the issues of importance in Finland, both personally and at the country level, are 
associated with economic issues. Contrary to the party data there is a distinct trend of economic 
preference in the Finnish public overall.  
At the country level, public opinion data shows that economic issues received 66% of 
responses in 2007 and 74% of responses in 2011 to a question asking to name important political 
problems (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5). At the personal level, there is slightly less of a clear 
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distinction, especially since there is a change in fifteen percent points of responses between 2007 
and 2011, all moving from economic issues to cultural issues. Though in 2011 economic issues 
continue to make up more responses, the difference goes from a difference of 40% to less than 
10%. This could partly be because the sheer number of cultural issues discussed increased from 






Though looking at the categorization of issues helps give a picture of competing policy 
dimensions, looking at specific issues will help explain what exactly defines each policy 
dimension. This is important because certain issues, like immigration, multiculturalism, law and 
order, and nationalism, are all issues that would likely favour PS. By evaluating the exact issues, 
we can see what kind of economic issues and sociocultural issues are important and whether they 
are beneficial to the new cultural parties. 
Table 4.4. Finland - What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election? 
(Egocentric) 
2007 % 2011 % 
Pensioner issues 8.03 Negative EU issues / stability funds 13.41 
Employment/unemployment 7.25 Employment/unemployment 9.01 
Care of the elderly 7.01 Finnish economy 5.7 
Status and support of families with 
children 6.7 Growth of income disparity 5.16 
Social and health care (general) 5.61 Pensioner issues 5.01 
Nature conservation 4.52 EU 4.08 
Taxation of pensioners 4.44 Care of the elderly 4.01 
  Immigrant policy 3.7 
 
Table 4.5. What do you think is the most important political problem facing Finland today? (Sociotropic) 
2007 % 2011 % 
Employment/unemployment 19.8 Poverty 29.89 
Poverty 16.6 Employment/unemployment 25.65 
Elderly issues 5.92 National economy 4.39 
Health care (general) 5.77 Elderly issues 4.31 
Environmental issues 3.59 EU 3.93 
Retirement 2.49 Immigrants: neutral attitudes 1.93 
Economic development 2.42 Health care (general) 1.69 
Social security 2.42 Retirement 1.69 
Alcohol / illegal drugs 2.26 Other problem (not specifiable) 1.69 
 
At the personal level, the most important issues in 2007 were pensioner issues, 
employment/unemployment, care of the elderly, status and support of families with children, and 
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social and health care general (all of these made up more than 5% of responses) (see table 4.4). 
In 2011 the most important issues were Negative EU issues/stability funds, 
employment/unemployment, the Finnish economy, growth of income disparity, and pensioner 
issues (see table 4.5). Negative EU issues/stability funds were categorized as a cultural issue 
because of the EU content, however, due to the lack of clarity in the issue category the issue 
could also be classified as economic because it mentions stability funds. If it was categorized 
economically, the swing in responses from economic to cultural in 2011 at the personal level 
would be almost wholly cancelled out. This would mean that in both elections at the personal 
and at the country level, more than 60% of respondents would have indicated an economic issue 
as the most important, meaning there would be a consistent preference of economic issues on 
both the country and personal levels. 
Interestingly, in 2007 there are no RRWP issues mentioned (see table 4.6), though there 
are new left issues, including climate change (1.56%), gender equality (1.01%), and nature 
conservation (4.52%). In 2011, we can see several issues that are relevant to RRWP, the EU 
(4.08%), immigration policy (3.7%), and tolerance and multiculturalism (1.46%). Though we do 
not know if these issues were important because people view them positively or negatively, it 
does tell us that in this election a larger portion of people had issues that are central to RRWP’s 
policies at the front of their mind.  
 Below Table 4.6 shows the top three most salient issues by party voted for. The most 
important issues at both the personal and country level in both elections are all economic for 
those that voted for the SDP, except for EU/EU politics in 2011, but it only receives about 5% of 
responses. For those that voted for Kok all of the most salient issues were economic in 2007. In 
2011 two sociocultural issues were salient, but EU/EU politics at only 5% and negative EU 
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issues at 12.5%.  
Table 4.6. Most Salient Issue by Party Vote - Finland 
 
PS had a more significant level of responses related to sociocultural issues, with over 12% saying 
immigration was the most important issue facing the country in 2007 and over 9% saying NATO 
was at a personal level. In 2011 Negative EU issues received 23.91% and immigration received 
over 9%. Generally, the majority of voters regardless of the party they voted for said 
SDP         
2007    2011    
Country Level  Personal Level  Country Level  Personal Level  
Employment 24.76% Pensions 13.81% Poverty 35.32% Employment 11.01% 
Poverty 21.43% Employment 11.90% Employment 31.65% Taxation 8.26% 
Health care 6.19% Care of the elderly 9.52% EU/ EU politics 5.05% Growth of income 
disparity  
8.26% 
Kok        
2007    2011    
Country Level  Personal Level  Country Level  Personal Level  





Poverty 11.96% Correction on 
income taxes 





Health care 7.61% Taxation 7.61% EU/ EU politics 4.76% Employment 11.31% 
PS        
2007    2011    
Country Level  Personal Level  Country Level  Personal Level  





Immigration 12.50% Status and support of 
family with children 
9.38% Employment 23.37% Employment 10.87% 
Health care 9.38% NATO 9.38% Elderly Issues 5.98% Immigration 9.78% 
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employment or poverty was the most important issue facing them and the country in both 
elections.  
Based on public opinion data and manifesto content in Finland, there seems to be a 
disconnect between the issues the parties discuss and the issues the public believes are highly 
important during the election. The issues that parties prime are not the ones that appear to be at 
the front of the public’s mind. It is possible that though the public sees some issues as important 
it may not be factored into vote choice. There is already much research on sociotropic versus 
egocentric voting and which is more likely, but in this case, both sociotropically and 
egocentrically the focus is on economic issues. Based on previous studies, if the public sees the 
economy as important, then the parties that are traditionally associated with economic 
responsibility should be more electorally successful, as the Social Democrats. But in 2007 and 
2011 the Social Democrats decreased its vote share from the previous election and Kok 
decreased its vote share in one of these elections. Running a multivariate analysis model looking 
at how different issues affected vote choice for each party may help explain why the True Finns 
saw such an increase in electoral success.  
4.3.3. Multivariate Analyses 
Based on the multivariate analysis of the three parties with a dependent variable of vote 
choice in 2007, the following was found. The only significant and strong variable predicting PS 
vote choice is PS Partisanship at 5.35. The independent variable Kok partisanship was omitted, 
due to the prediction of perfect failure, as no respondent holding Kok partisanship voted for PS. 
This multivariate analysis model only explains about 47% of the vote variance for PS. The 
multivariate analysis of vote choice for the SDP shows that two variables are significant. These 
variables are the SDP partisanship which is very strong at 5.34 and interestingly the PS 
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partisanship variable. The PS partisanship variable is much weaker at 1.63, but it is still 
significant. These variables explain 67% of the variance of votes for the SDP.  




















Looking at the independent variables in the multivariate analysis for the Kok vote choice, 
there are four significant independent variables, Kok partisanship, PS partisanship, right-wing 
ideology, and salience of economic issues at the personal level. The strongest variable by far is 
Kok Partisanship at 5.91, PS Partisanship at 2.01, right-wing ideology at 1.79, and salience of 
economic issues at the personal level at 1.25. The personal level issue salience coefficient is 
positive, so those that find economic issues important are more likely to vote for Kok. These 
variables all have a positive effect on vote choice for Kok and explain more than 73% of the 
variance in votes for Kok. 
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***Significance at 1%. **Significance at 5%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in 
parentheses.  
 
In the 2011 election model, PS Partisanship and aged over 50 are significant predictors of 
a vote for PS. Once again partisanship is a very strong predictor at 5.97 and aged over 50 at 1.50. 
The model explains 57% of the variance in vote choice of PS. In the SDP model, the variable 
SDP Partisanship is significant and very strong at 5.41, right-wing ideology is significant and 
negative at -1.16, and country level issue salience is significant at .85. The country level issue 
salience coefficient is positive, so those that found economic issues important at the country 
level are more likely to vote for SDP. The model explains 69% of the variance in vote choice for 
the SDP. In the Kok model, there are three significant variables - Kok partisanship at 5.96, 
personal level issue salience at .98, and aged over 50 at .81.  The personal level issue salience 
coefficient is positive, so those that find economic issues important are more likely to vote for 
 PS Vote SDP Vote Kok Vote 









































































Kok. The model omitted both PS partisanship and SDP partisanship, meaning that none of those 
that indicated partisanship for PS and SDP voted for Kok. The model explains 72% of the 
variation in votes for Kok. Apart from partisanship, in both the 2007 and 2011 age, ideology, and 
country and personal level issue salience were all significant at least once. Regarding the issue 
salience variables, they were significant twice. There is a positive relationship between finding 
economic issues important at the personal level and voting for Kok in 2011 and finding 
economic issues important at the country level increased the likelihood of voting SDP. 
The most significant independent variable in every vote choice model is partisanship. 
Since partisanship influences vote choice so strongly, it seems necessary to see if some of the 
independent variables could be influencing partisanship. The issue salience variables are the 
most important independent variables in the models on partisanship (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). 
Interestingly, two variables are significant and negative for PS partisanship, in 2007 the country 
level issue salience variable at -.97, and in 2011 the personal level issue salience at -.55. In both 
cases, this tells us that voters that found economic issues were less likely to hold PS partisanship. 
In the 2007 model for SDP partisanship, personal level issue salience is significant and positive 
.52, and again in 2011 at .47. For Kok partisanship in 2007, country level issue salience was 
significant at .52 and in 2011 personal level issue was significant at .55. Even if issue salience 
may not always be significant to vote choice, it was significant and influenced partisanship for 






 Table 4.9. Finland 2007 Partisanship Multivariate Analyses 
***Significance at 1%. **Significance at 5%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in 
parentheses.  
 
 Table 4.10. Finland 2011 Partisanship Multivariate Analyses 
***Significance at 1%. **Significance at 5%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in 
parentheses.  
 
 The data looking at Finland tells us that the PS focused on sociocultural issues and has 
achieved electoral success despite public opinion generally finding economic issues significantly 
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more important. However, some issues key to PS, like immigration and the EU are listed as some 
of the most important issues by the public. This could perhaps signal the early stages of a turn 
towards more cultural issue-based politics and it would be interesting to see which issues were 
salient in the public and party manifestos in the later 2015 and 2019 elections. The multivariate 
analyses tell us that issue salience in effecting some vote choice, but more significantly it is 
affecting partisanship. The partisanship models tell us that finding economic issues makes it 
more likely to hold partisanship of the mainstream parties SDP and Kok and makes it less likely 
to hold PS partisanship. This aligns with the thesis’ hypothesis that radical right-wing party 



















Chapter 5: Norway 
The Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) has, for most of its existence, continued to 
outperform itself at every election. Since its early creation and subsequent breakthrough into 
mainstream party politics, the FrP has arguably become one of the most well established and 
normalized RRWP in Europe. The 2009 election is the best electoral result to date for the FrP, as 
it received a higher vote share than even the elections which saw them join the government in 
2013 and 2017. Though the party holds some traditional conservative party characteristics, it is 
classified as a radical right-wing party in Ennser’s (2012) study on party families and Jungar & 
Jupkas’ (2014) evaluation and classification of Nordic far-right parties, and has been frequently 
cited as a radical right-wing party in other comparative works  (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 
Bale 2003; Bale et al 2010: Bjerkem 2016;  Downs 2001; Oesch 2008; Widfeldt 2018). The 
party is anti-establishment and anti-immigration, but less authoritarian and more economically 
right-wing than other RRWP, although it has recently moved towards the centre economically 
(Jungar & Jupskas 2014: 216). In the party’s manifesto it describes itself as “a ‘liberal people’s 
party with a base in the Norwegian constitution, Norwegian and Western tradition and cultural 
heritage ... [with] a Christian worldview and humanistic values” (Fremskrittspartiet 2009).  
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the history and issue salience of the FrP and the 
Norwegian party system and to see how the FrP was able to become the second-largest political 
party in parliament following the 2005 and the 2009 elections. Similar to the last chapter, this 
section will discuss the history of the party and party system to see how the FrP evolved into a 
third wave RRWP. Then using the manifesto data and public survey data, I will again investigate 
whether the economic or sociocultural dimension is more salient through the aggregation of 
issues into the two dimensions. Then I will look at a more detailed breakdown of issues to 
identify the individual issues which make up the policy dimensions to see which issues are 
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unique to the country and elections and to see if the RRWP’s new cultural issues are present in 
these two successful elections. This will be followed by multivariate analyses of vote choice. 
Since the FrP was very successful electorally in both of these elections, I expect to see highly 
salient sociocultural issues and to see new cultural issues on the political agenda.  
5.1. History of the Progress Party 
The FrP is one of the original modern far-right parties in Europe. It joined parliament in 
the Norwegian earthquake election of 1973 when the five-party system was disrupted by new 
parties (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 2). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Norway experienced 
a major expansion of the welfare state and an increase in taxes, but this occurred under a right-
wing bourgeoisie government rather than a left-wing labour government (Andersen & Bjorklund 
2008: 19). Right-wing party supporters had expected a policy change away from state expansion 
after the right-wing party formed government, so the frustration from a lack of diversity in policy 
positions between the two major left and right parties resulted in the election of more parties in 
1973 diversifying the party system.  
The FrP was created during the second wave of tax protest neoliberal right-wing parties, 
similar to the Danish Progress Party which has also gone on to be one of the most electorally 
successful RRWPs in Europe today. The FrP was created by Anders Lange and was initially 
called the ‘Anders Lange Party for Strong Reduction in Taxes and Public Intervention’ (Harmel 
& Svasund 1997: 319). Lange established the party after he felt the major right-wing party, the 
Conservatives, had abandoned many of its right-wing positions after forming a government. 
Lange’s initial goal in creating the party was to influence party positions and policy rather than 
trying to win many votes or seats (Harmel & Svasund 1997: 319).  
In its first election in 1973, the party won just over 5% of the vote share and four seats in 
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the national parliament, establishing it as a parliamentary party immediately after its creation 
(ibid, 320). Lange died in 1974, and after three years of uncertainty for the party, in 1977 Carl I. 
Hagan took over as leader and the party was renamed the Progress Party, taking the name of the 
recently formed Danish Progress Party (later renamed to the Danish People’s Party). Under 
Hagan the party became a third-wave RRWP moving away from predominantly neoliberal policy 
issues, with the leader stating that the party “combine[s] the best from social democratic thinking 
and the best from conservative thinking” (Downs 2002: 11), a statement reflective of De Lange’s 
‘new winning formula’. 
From 1977 to 2006 the party was chaired by Carl I. Hagan, who became the longest-
serving party leader in Norwegian history (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 21). Under Hagan the 
party became a highly disciplined, hierarchical, and centralized organization. Hagan’s long-term 
goal was to prepare the party for government by making the party responsible and predictable, 
which is a challenge faced by almost every RRWP in Northern and Western Europe (Andersen 
& Bjorklund 2008: 21). Hagan can also be categorized as a typical RRWP leader, he was good 
with the media, an effective speaker, and had a simple message aimed at the ‘common man’. He 
had a similar style to Jörg Haider, who completely rebranded the Austrian RRWP, the Freedom 
Party of Austria, and brought it major electoral success (Widfeldt 2000: 490).  
In the 1977 election as the newly branded FrP, the party lost all of its parliamentary seats, 
but in 1981 the FrP was elected back into parliament and has been represented there in every 
election since (Widfeldt 2018:5). After electoral support of around 10% in 1989 and 1993, in the 
1997 parliamentary election the party won the second-highest vote share of any party at around 
15% of the vote share. In 2001 the party’s vote share dropped and they became the third-largest 
party in parliament (see figure 5.1). In 2005, the party increased its electoral success and for the 
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first time received more than twenty percent of the vote share, winning 22.06% (Widfeldt 2018: 
5).  In 2006 Hagan was replaced by Siv Jensen, and under Jensen the party achieved its most 
successful electoral result winning 22.9% of votes in 2009. Since 2013 the party has remained 
the third-largest party in parliament, winning 16.35% of the vote share in 2013 and then 15.2% 
in 2017. FrP joined a minority government in 2013 with the Conservative Party and this coalition 
government continued after the 2017 election. 
    Figure 5.1. 
 
In Norway, there was continuity between the second and third wave of RRWP, as the 
same party represented the RRWP in the country during each wave (but with a change in name). 
The party’s roots as a neoliberal tax populist party is reflected in the party’s continual 
representation of neoliberal policies. This causes some inconsistencies as the party supports 
welfare chauvinist policies while holding onto its neoliberal policies, somewhere between the old 
and the new programmatic winning formula. The party actively supports strong neoliberal 
policies like reforming the public sector by introducing outsourcing, partial privatization of 
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hospitals, and tax cuts while also advocating for strong welfare programmes and support for the 
elderly (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 11). One of the key reasons the FrP can hold these 
seemingly contradictory policy positions is because the party argues that the country should use a 
part of its oil revenue to fund welfare programming while simultaneously cutting taxes (Bale 
2003: 73). This makes the FrP’s situation unique among radical right-wing parties that continue 
to hold neoliberal policies, as it can promote neoliberal policies without threatening socially 
liberal policies that involve government spending. There is, however, an ongoing debate about 
whether the government should be saving oil money or spending it.  
In 2005 the FrP adopted policies in favour of education in the Norwegian language, 
against subsidized housing, and affirmative action policies that favoured immigrants (ibid: 9). In 
2006 the party recommended an immigration policy that established a quota of one thousand 
“non-western” immigrants per year including asylum seekers and family reunification (ibid).  
The party is often grouped in with RRWP of continental Europe, but the party actively 
dissociates from overtly racist and radical movements, like Le Pen’s National Front, to maintain 
a respectable image (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 10). Despite this dissociation, the party 
maintains strong anti-immigrant positions. The manifestos of the FrP have included an explicit 
critique of multiculturalism and argued that an ethnically homogenous society was necessary for 
peace because different groups cannot co-exist peacefully (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 11). It 
also made the statement that “continued immigration of asylum seekers to anything like the 
extent seen in recent years will lead to serious conflicts between ethnic groups in Norway” 
(Widfeldt 2000: 491). Some of its other policies included repatriation of all refugees as soon as it 
was safely possible and limiting the number of resident permits for asylum seekers to one 
thousand a year (Widfeldt 2000: 491). The party also pushes more law and order policies with 
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harsher legal punishments and is a proponent of direct democracy (Widfeldt 2018: 9). 
The electoral rise of the FrP (see Figure 5.1) coincided with an increase in the number of 
immigrants from 200 to 8,617 between 1983 and 1987, a large increase for an ethnically 
homogeneous country (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 6). By 2006 the population of Norway was 
made up of 5% non-western immigrants, with a majority of the immigrant population residing in 
Oslo. This led to an increase in the salience of immigration-related issues like ghettoization, 
schooling, juvenile delinquency, language issues, unemployment, welfare dependency, prejudice, 
and discrimination (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 8). By 1988 immigration attitudes were a 
significant indicator differentiating FrP supporters from non-supporters, specifically the negative 
attitude towards immigrants (ibid: 7-8). Other significant indicators of RRWP support in Norway 
were dissatisfaction with democracy in the country, fear of welfare competition, and cultural 
protectionism (Oesch 2008: 359), and all of these issues are associated with the modern radical 
right.  
The issues that arose from the increase in immigration were framed culturally rather than 
economically, which is especially important for RRWP success. Under Hagen in the 1980s, the 
FrP adopted an anti-immigration line that received a lot of media attention (Downs 2001: 33). 
Though the party was initially a tax protest party, by the 1990s the FrP had adopted positions 
related to non-economic issues, including being the first openly anti-immigrant party in the 
country. Early on the party argued that money spent on asylum seekers should be spent instead 
on elderly and sick Norwegians (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 6). In 1994 the anti-immigration 
faction won control of the party over the liberalists, at which point the party dropped any pro-
immigration policy from its program. Following this faction take-over of the party, four out of 
ten party members left the party (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 10). This party policy change 
78 
marked the beginning of the modern FrP.  
5.2 Political Opportunity Structure 
The FrP continues to hold right-wing economic policies. This is likely because of the 
consensus on anti-immigrant policies amongst nearly all parties across the political spectrum in 
Norway. Stricter immigration policies known as the ‘immigration stop’ were introduced in 1975 
under the Labour Party government. The FrP played a major role in bringing immigration and 
integration into the political agenda and helped push the Conservatives towards a more 
restrictive immigration policy in the 1990s, but the rise of the FrP came after immigration 
policies had significantly tightened. In the 1990s the FrP was not able to establish complete 
ownership of the issue because of the other parties’ strong anti-immigrant and integration 
policies (Bale et al. 2010). Before 2000 even the left-wing Socialist Party had adopted a 
restrictive immigration policy, and because there was no concern for losing votes to the left, the 
Labour Party was able to adopt a restrictive immigration policy to compete with the right as well.  
After a Conservative government was elected in 2001 it passed a series of restrictive 
immigration policies making the party tough of immigration. There is more of a disagreement 
between the more minor right-wing parties on immigration parties than between the left and the 
right, but overall most parties hold restrictive immigration policies. Due to the passing of major 
immigration legislation in 1975 and 2001, by 2001 all the major parties had adopted restrictive 
policies (Bale 2003: 78). The Labour Party has proved to be a strong opponent to the FrP and has 
maintained over 30% of the vote share in every parliamentary election except in 2001. This is in 
spite of the increase in FrP vote share and its overlapping economically left and socially right 
voter base with the FrP. 
The FrP’s influence on party policy positions of competing parties is clear, as the 
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Conservative Party moved rightward on most issues between 1973 and 1993. Despite the 
existence of the moderate right-wing Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party, the only real 
threat to the Conservatives was the FrP on the radical right. The vote share of the more moderate 
Christian People’s Party and Centre Party had been decreasing between 1973 and 1993 but the 
FrP had been increasing. The threat of the FrP taking votes was probably a strong motivation for 
the Conservative Party to move its policies rightward.  
Coalition building is a key part of Norwegian electoral politics, and often influences the 
electoral success of parties. In the 2009 election campaign the major right-wing party, the 
Conservatives, stated it would be willing to form a government with any right-wing party, 
including the FrP. However, the minor right-wing parties, the Liberals and Christian Democrats, 
both stated they were unwilling to form a coalition with the FrP because of the differences in its 
immigration and economic policies (Allern 2010: 904). In wake of this, the FrP came out saying 
it would not support any government that excluded them even during a budget process. The 
unwillingness of the right-wing parties to work together meant that there was no real government 
coalition option among the right and no alternative to the left-wing Labour Party proposed red-
green alliance coalition that had been in power going into the election (Allern 2010: 906). 
Despite the uncertainty of a right-wing coalition, both the Conservatives and the FrP increased 
their vote share.  
Once again, the electoral system of a country plays a part in any parties’ success. Since 
1989 Norway has had a 4% electoral threshold (Andersen & Bjorklund 2008: 18). The country 
uses a direct election/open-list system, meaning they vote directly for a member to be their 
constituency representative and use proportional representation. The country is broken down into 
19 constituencies which elect multiple members, with a total of 169 members elected into 
80 
parliament. The number of members from each constituency varies by district based on 
population and area, but Oslo elects the most at seventeen and Aust-Agder the least with four. Of 
the 169 members elected, 150 are constituency representatives and 19 are members at large (one 
from each constituency) (Government of Norway 2017). Members of parliament are elected for a 
fixed four-year term and cannot call an early election.  
5.3. Issue Salience 
 The Finnish public opinion data told us that the public is focused on economic issues and 
the party manifestos are split depending on the party, but that RRWP issues were more salient in 
the 2011 election than the 2007 election. Now the study will do the same investigation into the 
Norwegian manifesto data and public opinion data to see which dimension dominates and which 
individual issues are at the front of voters and parties’ minds to see if they may have effected FrP’s 
electoral success. In the manifesto data, each manifesto’s content was coded at more than 98% of 
the content. In the public opinion surveys run by the Norwegian National Election Study with the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, they received 2,012 responses in the 2005 election and 
1,782 in the 2009 election.  
5.3.1 Issue Salience in Party Literature 
Based on the CMP data, it appears that the three major parties in Norway have made 
cultural issues almost equally or more important than economic issues (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). 
In both the 2005 and the 2009 elections the Labour Party (DNA) and Conservative Party (H) 









The DNA has a stronger preference for sociocultural issues with them making up over 56% 
and then over 59% in 2005 and 2009. H’s manifestos are more equally split, with over 51% and 
then over 52% going to sociocultural issues. Curiously, the FrP manifestos are made up of more 
economic content than sociocultural content in both elections. Again though, it is almost an even 




An analysis of specific issues in each manifesto will tell us exactly which issues were the 
most salient for each party. The most salient issue for the DNA was Welfare State Expansion, 
but the party also has many significant issues that are non-economic. In 2005 the second most 
salient issue was Internationalism (positive) and in 2009 it was Education Expansion. Of the six 
issues with over 5% in DNA’s 2005 manifesto, four of them were sociocultural, and of the six in 
2009 four were sociocultural. The issues of Equality (positive), Education Expansion, and 
Internationalism (positive) were all significant in both election manifestos. 
Table 5.1. DNA Manifesto Issue salience 
 2005 % 2009 % 
Economic Welfare State Expansion 16.587 Welfare State Expansion 17.365 
 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive 8.594 
Technology and Infrastructure: 
Positive 5.318 
Sociocultural Internationalism: Positive 10.216 Education Expansion 12.753 
 Equality: Positive 7.632 Environmental Protection 8.8 
 Education Expansion 6.37 Equality: Positive 6.824 
 Culture: Positive 5.469 Internationalism: Positive 5.129 
 
H’s number one issue in both elections was economic, though it was Free Market 
Economy in 2005 and Welfare State Expansion in 2009. In both years, similar to DNA, the 
second most salient issue was sociocultural, Freedom and Human Rights in 2005 and Education 
Expansion in 2009. H’s most salient issues were equally divided between economic and cultural 
issues, with three of each making up more than 5% of the manifesto in each election.  Education 






Table 5.2 H Manifesto Issue Salience 
 2005 % 2009 % 
Economic Free Market Economy 11.036 Welfare State Expansion 15.547 
 Welfare State Expansion 8.508 Economic Growth: Positive 7.739 
 
Technology and Infrastructure: 
Positive 7.028 
Technology and Infrastructure: 
Positive 5.906 
Sociocultural Freedom and Human Rights 8.693 Education Expansion 10.794 
 Education Expansion 8.261 Environmental Protection 8.69 
 Decentralization 5.24 Law and Order: Positive 6.857 
 
The FrP also had an economic issue as its most salient in both election manifestos, Free 
Market Economy in 2005 and Welfare State Expansion in 2009. Unlike DNA or H, the FrP’s 
second most important issue in both elections was also economic, with Welfare State Expansion 
and Technology and Infrastructure (positive) the second most important issue in each election. In 
2005 the three most salient issues were all economic, together these three economic issues alone 
made up around 33% of the manifesto content. The remaining three issues that received more 
than five percent were all sociocultural in 2005. In the 2011 manifesto, the eight issues that 
received more than five percent were split, with five economic and three sociocultural. Education 
Expansion and Military (positive) were significant in both elections. In 2011 Culture (positive) 
also become significant, making three core RRWP issues present and significant in at least one 
of the FRP manifestos.  
Across all parties, the issues of welfare state expansion, educational expansion, and 
technology and infrastructure (positive) were all significant in both elections. For all parties in 
both elections, the most salient issues were evenly split between economic and social issues, but 
the most salient issue was always an economic issue. The mainstream parties’ manifestos did 
contain more content on sociocultural elements than those of the FrP, so mainstream parties were 




Table 5.3. FrP Manifesto Issue Salience 
 2005 % 2009 % 
Economic Free Market Economy 12.737 Welfare State Expansion 10.443 
 Welfare State Expansion 11.334 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive 9.398 
 
Technology and Infrastructure: 
Positive 10.538 
Governmental and Administrative 
Efficiency 7.807 
   Free Market Economy 6.813 
   Incentives: Positive 5.022 
Sociocultural Education Expansion 9.439 Education Expansion 8.404 
 Law and Order: Positive 7.013 Military: Positive 6.713 
 Military: Positive 6.141 Culture: Positive 5.172 
 
5.3.2. Public Opinion 
 Now, we move on to look at how public opinion data compares to the manifesto data to 
see which dimension more salient, which issues were important, and if any of those issues would 
be beneficial to the FrP. Similar to the parties’ manifesto content, the public opinion data is 
relatively evenly divided between economic and sociocultural issues. On a personal level in 2005, 
the public favoured economic issues at around 52% and sociocultural issues at 34%. In 2009 this 
evened out to a difference of less than .10% between economic issues at 41.87% and sociocultural 
issues at 41.96% (see Figure 5.4).  On the country level, the difference is again small. In 2005 
economic issues make up just under 43% of responses and sociocultural just over 40%. In 2009 
sociocultural issues became more salient and made up almost 50% of responses with just under 












 Seeing as sociocultural issues are more salient to the public both personally and country-
wide in 2009, and sociocultural issues are almost equally salient to economic issues at the 
country level in 2005, it is important to see exactly which issues were important and whether 
they reflect the core issues of RRWP. On a personal level School and Education Issues are the 
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most popular response in both years, making up more than 14% of responses in 2005 and then 
more than 12% in 2009. In 2005 at the personal level Care for the Elderly, Taxes, and Health 
Services all made up a significant portion of responses. In 2009 on the personal level School and 
Educational issues, Environmental Issues (10.66%), Immigration/Refugee Policy (8.75%), Care 
for the Elderly (7.24%), Taxes (6.85%), and other Health/Social Issues (5.27%) were all 
significant.  
Table 5.4. Norway - What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election? 
(Egocentric) 
2005  % 2009 % 
School and educational issues 14.76 School and educational issues 12.79 
Care for the elderly 10.93 Environmental issues 10.66 
Taxes 6.96 Immigration / refugee policy 8.75 
Health service 4.97 Care for the elderly 7.24 
Social equalization/distribution 3.68 Taxes 6.85 
(Other) economic issues 3.53 (Other) health / social issues 5.27 
The question of government alternatives 3.43 Communication/transport 3.59 
Immigration / refugee policy 3.08 The question of government alternatives 2.97 
 
 On a country level, the most important issue in both years was Environmental Issues 
(13.57% and 15.43%). In 2005 this was followed by Employment (8%), the European Union 
(6.86%), Care for the Elderly (5.96%), School and Educational Issues (5.22%), and Health 
Service (4.67%). In 2009 Environmental Issues was followed by Climate Change/Policy, 
together making up over 25% of responses. This was followed by Immigration/Refugee Policy 










Table 5.5. What do you think is the most important political problem facing Norway today? 
(Sociotropic) 
2005 % 2009 % 
Environmental issues 8.7 Environmental issues 15.43 
Employment 8 Climate change / policy 11.84 
EU 6.86 Immigration / refugee policy 9.2 
Care for the elderly 5.96 Employment 8.42 
School and educational issues 5.22 Care for the elderly 7.18 
Health service 4.67 School and educational issues 4.71 
Poverty 3.73 Health service 3.37 
Industrial/trade politics 3.33 (Other) economic issues 3.14 
Other problem (not specifiable) 3.33 Other problem (not specifiable) 3.09 
Aid to developing countries 3.28 Oil politics / distribution of national resources 2.58 
Immigration / refugee policy 3.18 Communication/transport 2.19 
(Other) foreign policy issues 3.13 EU 2.13 
 
 In 2009 immigration was a salient issue in the public on both a personal and national 
level. This coincides with the FrP’s most successful electoral result. Of all the issues in the 
public opinion survey, Immigration / Refugee Policy is the only one that is a core radical right-
wing issue, though it is highly salient in 2009. Immigration, the EU, the Fight Against Terrorism 
in 2005 and the EU and Defence and Security Policy Issues in 2009 are all issues that likely 
would have favoured the FrP.  
Given the importance of environmental issues in the elections it is surprising the FrP did 
well, as the party does not believe global warming is man-made and is publicly skeptical of the 
United Nations Climate Panel conclusions (Aalberg 2009: 1069). In fact, in 2008 it was the only 
party in parliament that opposed a parliamentary wide climate agreement to be climate neutral by 
2030 (ibid). Though as the only party that is vocally unsupportive of climate change initiatives, 




Table 5.6. Most Salient Issues by Party Vote - Norway 
DNA        
2005    2009    
Country Level  Personal Level  Country Level  Personal Level  











8.27% Care for the 
elderly 
13.38% Climate Change 13.28% Environmental 
Issues 
10.33% 
EU 7.57% Health services 8.10% Employment 11.07% Care for the 
elderly 
9.41% 
H        
2005    2009    
Country Level  Personal Level  Country Level  Personal Level  
EU 11.03% Taxes 16.91% Environmental 
Issues 
13.59% Taxes 18.77% 
Employment 8.82% School and 
educational 
issues 






6.99% Other economic 
issues 
12.87% Care for the 
elderly 
9.06% Immigration 6.47% 
School and 
educational issues 
6.99% Interest rates 8.46% Employment 8.74% Care for the 
elderly 
6.47% 
FrP        
2005    2009    
Country Level  Personal Level  Country Level  Personal Level  
Care for the elderly 9.35% Care for the 
elderly 
15.16% Immigration 20.54% Immigration 28.62% 
Employment 8.39% Taxes 11.61% Employment 8.75% Taxes 12.79% 
EU 7.74% Immigration 11.61% Care for the 
elderly 




The breakdown of the three most salient issues depending on the party the respondent 
voted for (see Table 5.6) helps give insight into the issues that were most important in each 
electorate. Cultural issues are evenly spread out in responses for each electorate at both the 
personal and country level. Environmental Issues, Climate Change, School and Educational 
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Issues, and the EU are all amongst the most salient issues for respondents that voted for DNA. 
For DNA voters a sociocultural issue was the most salient issue among respondents at both the 
personal and country level in 2009 and the personal level in 2007. Respondents that voted for the 
Conservative Party (H) also listed sociocultural issues as the most important issue facing the 
country in both elections, with the EU in 2005 and Environmental Issues in 2009. Other salient 
sociocultural responses included Climate Change, Immigration, and School and Educational 
Issues. For the FrP supporters, Immigration was by far the most common response as the most 
important issue facing the country and personally in 2011. Apart from immigration, the only 
other sociocultural issue that received a significant amount of responses was the EU. Care of the 
elderly although not a sociocultural issue, is highly salient and is a radical right-wing party issue.  
Sociocultural issues are the most salient issue overall at the personal and country level. 
When looking at the most important issue by party choice, sociocultural issues are significant 
there regardless of the vote choice. The issues are also those of ‘new cultural politics’ that focus 
on the environment, climate change, immigration, and the EU. Despite the fact we can see that 
respondents do find sociocultural issues very salient, it is important to see whether these issues 
involved vote choice.  
5.3.3. Multivariate Analyses 
 
Looking at multivariate analysis models for vote choice can hopefully help explain the 
high levels of support for the FrP during these elections. In 2005 there are two significant 
variables in the model for voting for the Progress Party, post-secondary education which is 
negative at -.74 and right-wing ideology at 2.12, so those without post-secondary education and 
those with right-wing ideology are more likely to vote for FrP. The FrP Partisanship variable was 
dropped as it predicted success perfectly, meaning all those that indicated FrP partisanship voted 
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FrP. The model explains 13% of the variance in the FrP votes. There are three significant 
variables in the model for DNA vote choice, these are DNA partisanship, being female, and 
right-wing ideology. The DNA partisanship dummy is very strong and positive at 5.00, the 
female variable is relatively weak and positive at .64, the right-wing ideology coefficient is 
negative at -1.36. The model dropped the FrP partisanship as it predicted failure perfectly, 
meaning no respondents that identified FrP partisanship voted for DNA.  The model explains 
66% of the variance in DNA votes. 
 Table 5.7. Norway 2005 Multivariate Analyses                                                                                                                                          
 




There are two significant variables in the model for H vote in 2005, these are post-
secondary education and salience of economic issues at the personal level. The strongest variable 
is post-secondary education at 1.25, so those with a higher level of education are more likely to 
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support H.  The salience of economic issues coefficient is 1.16, because it is positive it means 
those that think economic issues are salient at the personal level are more likely to vote for H. 
The model omitted the FrP partisanship variable as it predicted failure perfectly, meaning those 
that indicated FrP partisanship did not vote H. This model explains 78% of the variance in votes 
for the Conservative Party. 
Table 5.8. Norway 2009 Multivariate Analyses 
 
***Significance at 1%. **Significance at 5%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in parentheses.  
 
In the 2009 election, there is a significant increase in the number of independent variables 
that predict a party vote. There are five significant variables in the model for an FrP vote - H 
partisanship, FrP partisanship, aged over 50, female, and salience of economic issues at the 
personal level. The strongest variable is FrP partisanship at 7.92, followed by H partisanship at 
2.47, then salience of economic issues at the personal level at -1.03, aged over 50 at .83, and 
being female at -.63. This model explains 60% of the variance of voting for the FrP. A positive 
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relationship between FrP partisanship, H partisanship, and a vote for FrP is not surprising, as 
both are parties on the right side of the political spectrum so voters could easily support either 
party. The negative coefficient of personal level issue salience tells us that voters that found 
sociocultural issues rather than economic issues important were more likely to vote FrP.  
There are three significant variables in the model for DNA vote in 2009, DNA 
partisanship, the salience of economic issues at the personal level, and right-wing ideology. The 
DNA partisanship variable is very strong and positive at 4.98, followed by the salience variable 
at the personal level, which is positive at .80, and right-wing ideology at -1.03. So, if one thinks 
economic issues are important at the personal level, then they are more likely to support DNA. 
The FrP partisanship variable was omitted as it predicts perfect failure, meaning respondents that 
held FrP partisanship never voted for DNA. The model explains 68% of the variance in votes for 
DNA. There are five significant variables in the model for H vote, there are H Partisanship, 
right-wing ideology, FrP partisanship, post-secondary education, and aged over 50. The H 
partisanship variable is relatively strong and positive at 3.6, right-wing ideology at 2.31, FrP 
partisanship at -1.99, and the education variable is weak at .95, meaning that more highly 
educated people are more likely to support H, and the aged over 50 variables is negative at -.55. 
The model explains 63% of the variance in H votes. 
Once again, the partisanship variables were by far the most significant vote choice 
predictor, so it is worth investigating if some of the independent variables may influence 
partisanship. In 2005 the issue salience variables were not significant for FrP partisanship. 
Personal level issue salience was significant for H partisanship at .54 and country level issue 
salience was significant for DNA partisanship at .38 (see table 5.9). In 2009 issue salience was 
again not significant for FrP partisanship, but personal level and country level issue salience 
93 
were significant and positive for DNA partisanship at .73 and .38 (see Table 5.10). These models 
indicate that economic issue importance affects mainstream party partisanship but not FrP 
partisanship. Apart from the issue salience variables, the post-secondary education and ideology 
variables were significant indicators of partisanship for every party in each election. 
Table 5.9. Norway 2005 Partisanship Multivariate Analyses 
***Significance at 1%. **Significance at 5%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in parentheses.  
 
Table 5.10. Norway 2009 Partisanship Multivariate Analyses 
***Significance at 1%. **Significance at 5%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in parentheses.  
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The Norwegian political arena has become much more evenly divided between 
sociocultural and economic issues and in 2009 it seems favours of sociocultural issues. The 
multivariate analyses showed that personal level issue salience affected voter support for FrP, 
DNA, and H support in at least one election. Both the mainstream parties favoured sociocultural 
issues in their election manifestos in 2005 and 2009, and public opinion was focused more on 
sociocultural issues in 2009 as well. Though some of the most salient issues are not RRWP 
issues per se, such as environmentalism and climate change policy, it does help move the 
political discussion to new cultural issues. Some core issues of the far-right have been appearing 
more in manifestos and public opinion like immigration and refugee policy, culture, defence and 
security, terrorism, and the European Union. This is surely beneficial to the FrP. Though the FrP 
focuses more on economic issues in its manifestos, it is clear that its voters focus on issues 
traditional to RRWP, like immigration, care of the elderly, and the EU. This means that the party 
is benefitting from the increase in issue salience of RRWP issues in public opinion and from its 
position as the radical right-wing party within the Norwegian party system. Based on the public 
opinion and manifesto data it could be said that the Norwegian public and parties have moved 








Chapter 6: Iceland 
In the Nordic landscape, Iceland stands as the only country to not have a radical right-
wing populist party emerge onto the political landscape. It did not follow Denmark and Norway 
in their second wave of tax populist parties in the 1970s and subsequent transformation into 
radical right-wing party, nor did it follow Finland’s agrarian party’s evolution into a radical 
right-wing party in the 1990s. Even Sweden, though late, has recently seen the parliamentary 
breakthrough of the far-right Swedish Democrats in 2010.  
Despite the Nordic party space being similar enough to be studied as a group (Grendstad 
2003; Jungar & Jupskas 2014; Widfeldt 2018), Iceland’s party system is unique in its historical 
absence of a radical right-wing populist party. This characteristic makes it worthy for this study 
to ask - why is there no right-wing populist party in Iceland? The prediction for this case is that 
sociocultural issues were less salient than economic issues, which made it unfavourable for a 
radical right-wing party to emerge. Iceland was one of the countries hit hardest by the 2008 
economic crisis. Following the literature that states RRWP are less likely to emerge in 
economically weaker countries because economic issues are more salient, I predict this theory 
will explain the Icelandic case’s absence of a radical right-wing party. This section will do a 
brief overview of the literature on the Icelandic party system and elections, which is relatively 
small in the English language, followed by a review of party manifesto data, and then public 
opinion data.  
6.1. Iceland’s Political and Party System History 
Unlike other Nordic countries that had the introduction of new parties in the 1970s, 
Iceland’s party system has been stable for more than half a century, only rocked by the economic 
crisis in 2008 and resulting political ‘crisis’ afterwards. The Icelandic party system has been 
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dominated by four parties since the 1930s - the right-wing socially and economically 
conservative Independence Party (IP), the centre-right Progressive Party (PP) which was 
previously an agrarian party but rebranded in the 21st century as a more centrist party, the 
centre-left Social Democratic Party, and until 1998 the left-wing People’s Alliance (Önnudóttir 
et al., 2017: 164). Historically the right-wing parties have been stronger electorally and more 
stable, compared to several party splits on the left occurring over time.  
Currently, the major parties include the Independence Party and Progressive Party on the 
centre-right side of the political spectrum, the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), a successor to 
the Social Democratic Party, and the Left-Green Movement, formed as a splinter party from the 
now-defunct People’s Alliance, on the left side of the political spectrum. Since 1971 every 
election has featured a small party that is normally elected into parliament but does not survive 
another election (Önnudóttir et al., 2017: 164). To date, there has never been a right-wing or 
ethno-nationalist party in Iceland, with most smaller parties that emerged being Left-Socialist, 
Social Democratic, or Liberal/Conservative (Indridason 2005: 445).  In the 2013 election, several 
different parties across the spectrum emerged. These parties included the Bright Future party on 
the left, the Reform Party on the right, and the Pirate Party focused on civil rights and direct 
democracy (John, 2016). These parties shook up the traditional party system by emerging as 
parliamentary opposition. However, in the 2007, election only the four main parties plus the 
Liberal Party were elected into parliament and in 2009 only the main four parties were elected 
into parliament.  
The policy competition in Icelandic politics is dominated by the left-right cleavage, with 
a focus on the welfare state and government intervention, followed by the urban-rural/centre-
periphery cleavage, and in the latter half of the 20th century, foreign policy has been another 
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relatively important cleavage (Hardarson & Kristinsson 2008: 373). In the 2009 election, a 
previous study found that economic issues were highly salient, specifically those related to 
borrowing foreign currency and mortgage payments (Önnudóttir, Schmitt, and Harðarson 2017: 
162).  
 Iceland elects 63 members to a unicameral parliament. There are six constituencies in 
Iceland, each electing between 9 and 12 members, with nine seats in parliament distributed based 
on the national results to ensure proportionality. A party must surpass a 5% threshold to be 
allocated one of these nine seats (Hardarson & Kristinsson 2002: 373).  
Between 1995 and 2007, for three consecutive terms, the Independence Party and 
Progressive Party were in a centre-right coalition government (Hardarson & Kristinsson 2008: 
373). Before the 2007 election, both the Independence Party and Progressive Party elected new 
leaders, and both focused on traditional left-right issues: welfare issues, care of the elderly, 
education, health, and family issues (ibid). The Left-Green Movement focused on environmental 
issues, which were particularly salient at the time because of recent proposals to expand energy-
intensive industries around the country. The Progressive Party was the biggest loser in the 2007 
election, as it lost six percentage points of its vote share from 2003. The Social Democratic 
Alliance also decreased its vote share. The Left-Green Movement was the winner, increasing its 
vote share by five percentage points. The Independence also increased its vote share but more 
modestly (Hardarson & Kristinsson 2008: 374). In 2007 a grand coalition was formed between 
the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Alliance; this is notable as it followed several 






6.1.1. Iceland’s 2009 Election 
The 2009 election was early, called after the dissolution of the grand coalition between 
the IP and SDA as a result of the aftershock of the economic crisis. In 2008 the three major 
Icelandic banks collapsed, and since the banks had grown to be over nine times the size of the 
Icelandic economy, the government couldn't back the banks during the crisis (Hardarson & 
Kristinsson 2010: 523). Following the crash, mass protests broke out in Reykjavik calling for an 
election and the resignation of politically appointed members of the finance sector. These 
protests have gone on to be called the ‘pots and pans revolution’ demanding “the rascals to be 
thrown out” (ibid: 524). Around 25% of the Icelandic population participated in the government 
protests and around 75% of Icelanders supported the demands of the protesters: government 
resignation, an election, and the resignation of major figures in the Central Bank and Icelandic 
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Financial Supervisory Authority, and constitutional revision of the political system. The protests 
continued for around four months until all the demands were met (Önnudóttir, Schmitt, 
Harðarson 2017: 163).  
During the mass protests, the SDA as a member of the coalition government called for 
the Prime Minister (a member of the Independence Party) to resign. After the IP refused the SDA 
pulled out of the coalition and the government fell. The Progressive Party stated they would 
support a left-wing government if it was formed and in February 2009 a coalition government 
was formed by the SDA and the Left-Green Movement with support from the PP on the 
condition that an election was called as soon as possible (Hardarson & Kristinsson 2010: 524). 
Though the SDA had been in government during the crash, the Independence Party had been in 
government for over a decade and therefore took the blame for the crash over the SDA, which 
had only been in government since 2007 (ibid). The Left-Green Movement saw an increase in 
public support during this political crisis partly because they were publicly driving the anti-
government protests.  
In preparation for the 2009 election and response to the protests, the parties changed 
many of their candidates, and three of the four major parties changed leadership (two did so 
within a month of the election) (ibid). In 2009, 43% of candidates elected were new to 
parliamentary politics (Hardarson & Kristinsson 2010: 525). Opinion polls as early as February 
indicated that this election could produce the largest swing of support to left-wing parties in 
Icelandic history and potential for the first-ever majority socialist government (Hardarson & 
Kristinsson 2010: 525). The biggest loser by far in the election was the Independence Party, 
losing thirteen percentage points of its vote share. This resulted in them no longer being the 
biggest party in parliament (ibid). The Social Democratic Alliance and Left-Green Movement 
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together won 52% of all votes and went on to form a majority coalition for the first time in 
history (ibid).  
Considering the Independence Party is historically the party most associated with 
economic freedom and policy, and they were the party blamed and subsequently punished for the 
economic crisis, this should have opened the party system for another right-wing party. The 
Independence Party was also socially conservative and nationalistic and had ties to both the 
working class and trade unions as well as the upper class (Indridason 2005: 442). Given the IP’s 
sociocultural beliefs, there should have been an electorate with preferences that match the 
ideology and position of a radical right-wing party on social issues. But instead of a right-wing 
party benefitting or emerging from the Independence Party’s demise, it was primarily the left-
wing parties that benefited from the realignment of the electorate.  
The Progressive Party increased its vote share in 2009 by under three percentage points, 
but the Left-Green Movement increased its vote share by over seven percentage points and the 
SDA by just over three percentage points, meaning the left-wing parties took more than two-
thirds of the Independence Parties prior supporters (Norwegian Centre for Research Data).  The 
Progressive Party may have slightly increased its vote, but they remained the fourth biggest 
party, a position they found themselves in 2007 for the first time in more than a decade. In 2013 
the Independence Party and Progressive Party were re-elected into office, arguably because they 
were able to capitalize on populist electoral promises desired by the public (Önnudóttir, Schmitt, 
and Harðarson 2017: 165). 
6.2. Issue Salience 
 Iceland is rarely used as a country case study, nor is it often considered in small-N 
comparative studies, even when looking at Nordic politics. This means that Iceland has been 
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largely neglected in the literature looking at party politics, issue salience, and public opinion, 
even though there is a large set of public opinion data and party manifesto data available to 
researchers. Given the country has seldom been looked at, this study can offer insight into issue 
salience in the country, and the salience of economic compared to sociocultural issues between 
2007 and 2009.  
Following the last two country cases, this section will look at the manifesto content of the 
two major left and right parties in Iceland, the Social Democratic Alliance (The Alliance for 
short) (SDA) and the Independence Party (IP). All content of the manifestos was successfully 
coded into categories, so 100% of content has been considered. After looking at a comparison of 
aggregated economic and sociocultural issues by party manifesto, there will be an analysis of the 
individually most important issue by party to gain insight into the aggregated data. After the 
manifesto data, there will be a similar aggregation of public opinion responses of the most 
important issues at the personal and country level. There were 1,595 respondents in 2007 and 
1,385 respondents in 2009 in the Icelandic National Election Study and the Comparative Study 
of Electoral System survey that were run together. 
6.2.1. Issue Salience in Party Literature 
 The issue salience in party manifestos in Iceland is surprising. In 2007, the two major 
parties are almost evenly split between economic and sociocultural issues. The Social 
Democratic Alliance’s content was slightly in favour of sociocultural issues at 51.4% to 
economic issues at 48.6% (see figure 6.2) and The Independence Party leaned slightly in favour 
of economic issues at 51.3%, compared to 48.7% for sociocultural issues. This equal division 
between economic and sociocultural issues echoes the data from the Norwegian election studies 
and could signify a move towards new cultural issues coming to shape how the political 
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In 2009, soon after the economic crash, the manifesto content is not as economically 
skewed as expected. The Independence Party did move towards more economic content, 
increasing to 58%, a seven percentage point increase at the expense of sociocultural issues. The 
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Social Democratic Alliance increased its sociocultural content to 59%, an increase of seven 
percentage points at the expense of economic issues. Despite the economic crisis the SDA 
retained sociocultural issues as more salient in its manifesto.  
When looking at the most salient issues in the Social Democratic Alliance’s manifesto, 
they too are evenly divided between economic (three issues) and sociocultural issues (four 
issues) in both election manifestos (see table 6.1). The fact that sociocultural issues are more 
salient in 2009 for the party is more easily explained when seeing that three issues ‘Equality’, the 
‘EU’, and ‘Environmental Protection’ together make up 35% of the manifesto. The EU has 
become a salient issue in 2009 having previously not met the threshold of significance (5%) is 
not surprising, since joining the EU and adopting the Euro was a very popular proposal after the 
economic crash. Apart from this, between 2007 and 2009 there is more than a ten percentage 
point decrease in SDA’s manifesto content allocated to Welfare State Expansion, Economic 
Goals content is halved, Education Expansion and Government Efficiency both drop below the 
5% threshold of significance. In both years Equality holds around 14-15% of manifesto content, 
clearly an issue of ownership for the SDA. Between the elections, five of seven of the most 
salient issues remain as the most important issues. Issues seem to be relatively stable and the 
changes in significance of issues are largely explained by events in the political world.  
Table 6.1. Social Democratic Alliance Manifesto Issue Salience 
 2007 % 2009 % 
Economic Welfare State Expansion 17.143 Economic Growth: Positive 11.538 
 Economic Goals 11.429 Economic Goals 6.154 
 Governmental and 
Administrative Efficiency 5.714 Welfare State Expansion 6.154 
Sociocultural Equality: Positive 15.714 Equality: Positive 14.615 
 Education Expansion 7.143 European Community/Union: Positive 11.538 
 Environmental Protection 5.714 Environmental Protection 10.769 
 Democracy 4.286 Democracy 6.154 
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The Independence Party’s most salient issues are reflective of the aggregate data, with 
slightly more economic issues making up its significant issues in both elections. Five of nine of 
the issues in 2007 and five of seven in 2009 are economic issues. In 2007 the top three issues of 
Welfare State Expansion, Economic Growth, and Technology and Infrastructure make up 30% of 
manifesto content. 
Table 6.2. Independence Party Manifesto Issue Salience 
 2007 % 2009 % 
Economic Welfare State Expansion 12.658 Incentives: Positive 9.877 
 Economic Growth: Positive 10.759 Economic Goals 9.877 
 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive 7.595 Free Market Economy 8.642 
 Free Market Economy 5.063 Economic Growth: Positive 8.642 
 Economic Orthodoxy 5.063 Economic Orthodoxy 8.642 
Sociocultural Equality: Positive 7.595 Political Authority 11.111 
 Environmental Protection 5.063 Democracy 7.407 
 Education Expansion 5.063   
 Non-economic Demographic Groups 5.063   
 
In 2009 the most salient issue is Political Authority, which is fitting given the 
anti-government protests, but the next five most salient issues were economic and together made 
up 45% of manifesto content. Only four issues are present in the most salient issues in both 2007 
and 2009, Economic Goals, Economic Growth (Positive), Free-Market Economy, and Economic 
Orthodoxy, all of them economic and related to typical right-wing liberal-conservative economic 
policies, but there is less consistency in which sociocultural issues are salient in the manifesto. 
In all parties’ manifestos the issues of Equality, Economic Growth. Economic Goals and 
Democracy have been salient in both elections. Apart from these, there is not much consistency 
in issues across parties or even across elections. Sociocultural issues, in particular, seem to be 
less consistent when considering which ones are salient. This suggests that perhaps individual 
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parties have not established clear issue ownership of sociocultural issues. This could also suggest 
that economic issues still define the party competition and the policies that parties choose to 
focus on in their manifestos.  
6.2.2. Public Opinion 
 
 I expect economic issues to be more salient than sociocultural issues in the Icelandic 
public opinion data even though in the manifesto data, sociocultural issues were more salient for 
at least one party in each election. Unlike the case studies of Finland and Norway, the number of 
responses that fit into the ‘Other’ category in Iceland is much higher. These responses include 
‘Don’t know’, ‘Other problem’, ‘No problem’, or ‘Refused’ The ‘Other’ category makes up just 
over 36% of responses to the country level question in 2009. The majority of the responses that 
contribute to this high number are ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Other problem’. This in itself is interesting 
as this means one-fifth of responses were not categorized into either economic or sociocultural 
issues. Keeping this in mind, when looking at the data, the public is much more focused on 
economic issues at both the personal and country level.   
Though responses to both the personal and country level questions indicate that economic 
issues are more salient, the personal level responses are more skewed economically. In 2007 
before the financial crisis, economic issues made up almost 50% of responses as the most 
important personal issues. In 2009 an even clearer preference for economic issues is shown, with 



















 At the country level in 2007, around 36% of answers fit into the ‘Other’ category, but of 
the remaining answers just over 38% are economic issues, compared to 24% sociocultural issues 
(see figure 6.5). This is by far the smallest difference between the salience of economic and 
sociocultural issues in Iceland in either election. In 2009, similar to the personal level responses 
that year, economic issues become far more salient, increasing to just over 58% from 38% in 
2007. When looking at the categorized and aggregated data, economic issues are far more salient 








 In 2007 when looking at the data breakdown of the exact issues’ respondents gave for the 
personal level question, the most common response was ‘Don’t know’ making up nearly 15% of 
responses (see table below). This is a big contributor to the ‘Other’ category and helps explain 
why the category was so big. The next most salient issues were The Elderly/People With 
Disability at 12%, then Social Welfare at 11%, followed by Environmental Issues at 8%. The 
personal level salience question in this election saw the highest responses of sociocultural issues 
at 29%. The Elderly/People With Disability and Environmental Issues alone make up 20% (of 
the total 28%) meaning there is not a variety of sociocultural issues that are dominant in Iceland, 
but instead a relatively high percentage dominated by fewer issues.  
In 2009 at the personal level, nearly 45% of all responses related to the top three issues 
The Economy, The Economic Crisis, and Welfare of the Households (the Economic crisis). The 
fifth most salient is the EU and European issues (around 7% of responses) and is categorized as a 
sociocultural issue. Depending on whether European issues focused on the adoption of the Euro 
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it could have been categorized as an economic issue, but since the issue was defined as 
‘European issues/EU/EEA/EFTA/the Euro’, it is difficult to say whether it was framed in an 
economic or sociocultural way. Regardless of the framing of the one issue, most of the responses 
of salient issues in 2009 at the personal level focus on the economy. After the broad EU 
category, Employment and Social Welfare, are the next most salient issues. Apart from European 
issues, each sociocultural issue received less than 3% of responses. 
 
Table 6.3. Iceland - What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election? 
(Egocentric) 
2007 % 2009 % 
The elderly / people with disability 12.52 The economy 15.38 
Social welfare 11.45 The economic crisis/bank crisis/currency crisis 15.23 
Environmental Issues 8.24 Welfare of the households (the Economic crisis) 13.57 
The economy 6.61 European issues / EU / EEA / EFTA / the Euro 6.93 
Health matters 6.48 Employment 6.79 
Family matters 5.85 Social welfare 3.1 
Employment 3.84 Other problem (not specifiable) 3.1 
Education 3.65 Democracy / democratic reform / political trust 2.53 
Transportation / Regional policy 3.65 Family matters 2.38 
Building up power stations/ energy 
issues 
2.52 Joining the EU/adopting the euro 1.73 
 
In 2007 at the country level, just over 30% of respondents gave the response ‘Don’t 
know’. This helps clarify the 36% of responses that contributed to the ‘Other’ category for that 
year and question. The response ‘Don’t know’ was by far the most salient, with the next most 
salient issue being Energy Issues/Power Stations at around 7%. After this the issues are relatively 
evenly divided between economic and sociocultural issues, with Environmental Issues receiving 
nearly 6%, followed by The Economy, European Issues, The Elderly/People with Disability, 
Equality/Living Standards, and The Fishery Quota System all received between 3 and 4% of 
responses.  Apart from the response ‘Don’t know’, no issue dominated public opinion during this 
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election.  
 In 2009 the most salient issue was The Economic Crisis, receiving just under 30% of 
responses (see table 6.4). The second most salient response was ‘Don’t know’ at 10%, followed 
by Icesave (bank) at 9%. Restoration/Saving the Country/Nation received 6% of responses and 
Welfare of the People (the Economic Crisis) received 5%. These four issues (those mentioned 
above except ‘Don’t know’) together made up 50% of responses, and each of them relates 
directly to the economic crisis (other more general answers related to the economy and 
employment also received responses but are not included in the total listed). Of the ten issues 
that received more than 3% of responses, six are economic, two are sociocultural (both relating 
to the European Union/European issues), and the remaining are ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Other 
problem’. The most salient issues were therefore made up predominantly of economic issues.  
 
Table 6.4. What do you think is the most important political problem facing Iceland today? 
(Sociotropic) 
2007 % 2009 % 
Energy issues / power stations 6.96 The economic crisis/bank crisis/currency crisis 29.75 
Environmental Issues 5.77 Icesave (bank) 9.17 
The economy 4.83 European issues / European Union / Euro 7.44 
European issues / European Union / Euro 4.83 Restoration /saving the country /nation 6.21 
The elderly / people with disability 3.76 Employment 6.14 
Equality, living standards 3.32 The economy 5.56 
The fishery quota system 3.13 Welfare of the people (the Economic crisis) 5.05 
Other problem (not specifiable) 2.82 Other problem (not specifiable) 4.4 
Economic stability 2.76 Joining the EU / adopting the euro 3.39 
Social welfare 2.7 Democracy / political trust 2.24 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows the most important issue depending on the respondents’ vote choice, 
those that voted for the SDA found sociocultural issues more important than those that voted for 
IP. This is likely because the SDA argued that joining the EU and adopting the Euro would help 
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the economic crisis, while the IP did not agree with this, so the EU as an issue is more likely to 
have been important to SDA voters. In 2009 the only sociocultural issues that are highly salient 
are European Issues and Joining the EU. These two issues, though sociocultural, were likely 
discussed in relation to the economic crisis. The IP’s most salient issues are predominantly 
economic, with only two non-economic issues in either election at either level – Environmental 
Issues in 2007 at the country level and The Elderly at the personal level in 2007. In 2009 the IP’s 
top issues were only economic. According to the public, economic issues appear to be 
significantly more salient than sociocultural issues even though parties’ manifesto content is 
more evenly divided. 
 
Table 6.5. Most Salient Issue by Party Vote - Iceland 
SDA         
2007       2009       















Energy issues 5.73% The elderly 15.56% 
European 
issues 9.85%  
Welfare of the households/the 
people, the economic crisis 
14.93% 
  
Equality 5.73% Family matters 
 
9.22%  Joining the EU 8.66% The economic crisis 13.43% 
      European issues 12.24% 
IP               
2007    2009    
Country Level    Personal Level    Country Level   Personal Level   
The economy 7.36% The economy 13.55% The economy 33.47% The economic crisis 19.01% 
Energy issues 6.34% The elderly 12.73% Employment 11.57% The economy 19.01% 
Environmental 
issues 6.34%  Social welfare 8.01%  Icesave bank 10.33% 
Welfare of the households/the 
people, the economic crisis 13.64%  
  Health matters 8.01%     
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6.2.3. Multivariate Analyses 
Multivariate analysis can tell us more about the relationship between economic and 
cultural issue salience and party vote choice in Icelandic politics. In the 2007 election SDA vote 
choice model there are two significant variables, SDA Partisanship and economic issue salience 
at the country level (see table 6.7). The partisanship variable is very strong at 6.35 and the 
salience variable is relatively weak at .83. Since the salience variable is positive it means those 
that think economic issues at the personal level are salient are more likely to vote for the SDA. 
The model explains 75% of the variance in the SDA voting. There are two significant variables 
in the model for the IP vote choice, IP partisanship and right-wing ideology. The partisanship 
variable is very strong at 6.08 and right-wing ideology is positive at 1.50. The model explains 
82% of the variation in IP votes. In this election voters for each party were influenced by 
important economic issues, but for IP supporters they were issues at the personal level and for 
SDA supporters at the country level. 
In the 2009 SDA vote choice model, the only significant variable is SDA Partisanship at 
4.87. The model explains 58% of the variation in SDA votes. There are three significant 
variables in the model for IP vote choice, these are IP partisanship, which is strong at 4.54, being 
female at .56, and right-wing ideology at 1.25. This means that being female and holding right-
wing ideology both make one more likely to vote IP. The model explains 62% of the variation in 
votes choice for the Independence Party. In each of these elections’ partisanship is the most 
significant variable. Issues are only significant for SDA vote choice in the 2007 election and only 




























***Significance at 1%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in parentheses.  
 






















***Significance at 1%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in parentheses.  
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Similar to Finland and Norway, partisanship is the most significant independent variable, 
so once again an investigation into whether the independent variables could explain partisanship 
is relevant. When looking at partisanship, there are two significant variables for SDA 
partisanship in each election. In 2007 the coefficient for personal level issue salience was 
positive at .63 and in 2009 it was negative at -.62. In 2007 finding economic issues important had 
a positive influence on holding SDA partisanship, but in 2009 it had a negative influence on 
SDA partisanship (see tables 6.8 and 6.9). In both elections’ ideology was also significant, 
unsurprisingly there is a negative relationship with holding right-wing ideology and SDA 
partisanship. In 2007 the right-wing ideology coefficient was -1.87 and in 2009 it was -1.36. For 
the IP the only significant variable in either election was right-wing ideology. This was positive 
in both elections, 3.62 in 2007 and 3.55 in 2009, so holding right-wing ideology has a positive 
effect on holding IP partisanship. 


















***Significance at 1%. **Significance at 5%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in parentheses.  
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***Significance at 1%. *Significance at 10%. Standard Error in parentheses.  
6.3. Conclusion  
After looking at the data on Iceland several interesting and unexpected findings have 
emerged. The manifesto data in 2007 was much more evenly divided between economic and 
social issues for the two main parties, SDA and IP. Content for both parties was split between the 
two issue categories at a ratio of 49:51, with each favouring either economic or social issues. In 
2009 the manifesto breakdown polarized more, with each of the main parties focusing more on 
the category of issues that it was originally skewed towards. The Social Democratic Alliance’s 
sociocultural content increased to make up 59% of its manifesto and the Independence Party 
increased economic content to 58%. The emphasis on sociocultural issues in The Social 
Democratic Alliance’s manifesto is surprising given the economic crisis. The public opinion data 
showed that the issues in the public are much more focused on economic issues. Even before the 
economic crisis in 2007 there was still a preference for economic issues. When looking at the 
multivariate analyses the only consistently significant independent variable was partisanship, 
 SDA Partisanship IP Partisanship 






































with country level issues significant in 2007. The data has demonstrated that the public is very 
focused on economic issues in Iceland, but one party, the SDA is more focused on sociocultural 
issues.  
The Icelandic public's focus on economic issues both before and after the economic crisis 
could be one reason for the absence of a radical right-wing party in Icelandic politics. Political 
issues core to RRWP ideology are also missing from Icelandic politics, though some new left 
issues have become more salient. It could also be that compared to other Nordic countries, 
political parties have remained polarized enough that there is no room or need for a radical right-
wing party in the party system. These three things together likely play a big part in explaining 














Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 There are a variety of factors that go into a party’s electoral success, making it difficult to 
determine exactly why non-mainstream parties are seeing increasing popularity. The varied 
electoral success of RRWP in particular in national politics across the European continent is still 
a puzzle that remains unsolved. By looking at Finland, Norway, and Iceland, this work has 
investigated three understudied, but valuable cases of countries with varied radical right-wing 
party success. The question guiding this thesis asked what influences radical right-wing party 
electoral success and why radical right-wing parties are more electorally successful in some 
countries than others. It offered the hypothesis that varied economic and sociocultural issue 
salience affects the supply and demand of RRWP and therefore the success of these parties. By 
looking at data on public opinion and party manifestos this study has done an in-depth analysis 
of issue salience in both the supply and demand of RRWP, which has yet to be given significant 
attention in the discipline. A broad summary of the findings is that in the country with the 
strongest radical right-wing party, Norway, public opinion was either equally divided between 
economic and sociocultural issues or more focused on sociocultural issues. Manifesto content 
was also generally skewed towards sociocultural issues in Norway. This is in contrast to Finland 
and Iceland where economic issues remained the most important by a significant margin in 
public opinion, and manifestos were evenly divided between economic and sociocultural issues.  
7.1. Manifesto and Public Opinion Data Conclusions 
When looking at manifesto data, there was not always a clear divide of issue salience by 
party type or by election. In Norway, the two mainstream parties both focused on cultural issues 
over economic issues in each election, though curiously the radical right party focused on 
economic issues in both elections. The mainstream parties’ focus on sociocultural issues suggests 
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that the Norwegian party system has moved towards sociocultural issues, which is favourable to 
the radical right. In Finland, the radical right-wing party emphasized sociocultural issues in both 
elections. The mainstream right-wing party focused on sociocultural issues in the second 
election, which could signal a cooptation reaction to the far-right. Iceland in both elections 
presents the more traditional left and right-wing issue breakdown, with the left focusing on 
sociocultural individualistic issues and the right on economic issues.  
To outline the findings in the paper, Table 7.1 (pg. 118) breaks down the salience of 
economic compared to sociocultural issues in each country for every party type and election, and 
Table 7.2 summarizes public opinion findings on both the personal and country level in each 
country. I have devised five different categories to describe the ‘preference’ a party or the public 
in each country had towards economic or sociocultural issues depending on the difference in the 
salience of economic and sociocultural issues when they were aggregated into ‘economic’ and 
‘sociocultural’ categories (percentage totals seen in bar graphs for country cases). When the 
sociocultural dimension was more salient the text was bolded in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. The 
preference for issues is categorized as follows:  
1. ‘Even split’ indicates there was less than a two percentage point difference in manifesto 
content/survey responses of each dimension;  
 
2. ‘Slight preference’ indicates a two to five percentage point difference in manifesto 
content/survey responses of each dimension;  
 
3. ‘Moderate preference’ indicates a five to ten percentage point difference in manifesto 
content/survey responses of each dimension;  
 
4. ‘Strong preference’ indicates between ten to twenty percentage point difference in 
manifesto content/survey responses of each dimension;  
 
5. ‘Very strong preference’ indicates over twenty percentage point difference in manifesto 





Table 7.1. Summary of Manifesto Findings 
 Left-Wing Manifesto Right-Wing Manifesto Far-right Manifesto 
Finland 2007: Strong economic 
preference 
 
2011: Very strong 
economic preference 















2007: Slight economic 
preference 
 
2009: Strong economic 
preference 
n/a 





2005: Slight sociocultural 
preference  
 
2009: Slight sociocultural 
preference 
2005: Slight economic 
preference 
 
2009: Strong economic 
preference 
   
Table 7.2. Summary of Public Opinion Findings 
 Public Opinion - Personal Public Opinion - Country 
Finland 2007: Very strong economic 
preference 
 
2011: Moderate economic preference 
2007: Very strong economic preference 
 
2011: Very strong economic preference 
Iceland 2007:  Very strong economic 
preference 
 
2009:  Very strong economic 
preference 
2007: Strong economic preference 
 
2009: Very strong economic preference 
 
Norway 2005:  Strong economic preference 
 
2009: Even split 
2005: Even split 
 
2009: Moderate sociocultural preference 
7.2. Multivariate Analyses Conclusions 
The breakdown of issues helps give some insight into the competing issue dimensions, 
but multivariate analysis models help to look specifically at the relationship between vote choice 
and the influence of economic and sociocultural issues. Tables 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 lists each 
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significant independent variable for every party vote choice in each country. Issue salience at the 
personal level was significant four times, and issue salience at the country level was significant 
once. This suggests personal level issue salience is more likely to influence vote choice than 
country level issue salience.  
In the 2007 Finnish election, finding economic issues important at the personal level 
increased the likelihood of voting for Kok. In the 2007 Icelandic election finding economic 
issues important at the national level increased the chances of voting for the SDA. The issue 
salience variables were the most significant in Norway. Economic issues were important at the 
personal level and increased the likelihood of voting for H in 2005 and DNA in 2009. If 
sociocultural issues were important at the personal level in 2009 one was more likely to vote for 
the FrP. Partisanship is by far the most frequent significant variable, with age, education, and 
gender all being significant at least once. 
Table 7.3. Finland Vote Choice- Significant Independent Variables and Coefficients 
Party Country and Election Variables p values <0.10 Coefficient  
PS Finland 2007 PS Partisanship 5.347708 
SDP Finland 2007 SDP Partisanship 5.341858 
      PS Partisanship 1.626345 
Kok Finland 2007 Kok Partisanship 5.910334 
  PS partisanship 2.009725 
  Personal Issue Salience 1.252593 
  Right-wing Ideology 1.787881 
PS Finland 2011  PS Partisanship 5.969187 
  Aged Over 50 1.499416 
SDP  Finland 2011  SDP Partisanship 5.409356 
  Right-wing Ideology -1.161014 
Kok Finland 2011 Kok Partisanship 5.958655 
  Aged Over 50 .8093582 




























7.3. Core Findings and Future Work 
This work has presented some broad findings on issue salience and how it relates to vote 
choice and RRWP electoral success. The multivariate analysis for vote choice found that issue 
Party Country and Election Variables p values <0.10 Coefficient  
IP  Iceland 2007 IP Partisanship 6.076516 
  Right-wing Ideology 1.495768 
SDA Iceland 2007 SDA Partisanship 6.345117 
  Country Issue Salience .8319713 
IP  Iceland 2009 IP Partisanship 4.542691 
  Female .5633666 
  Right-wing Ideology 1.2549 
SDA Iceland 2009 SDA Partisanship 4.869733 
Party Country and Election Variables p values <0.10 Coefficient  
FrP Norway 2005 Post-Secondary Education -.7408344 
  Right-wing Ideology 2.11676 
DNA Norway 2005 DNA Partisanship 5.003788 
  Right-wing Ideology -1.356479   
Female .6424931 
H Norway 2005 Post-Secondary Education 1.254544   
Personal Issue Salience 1.161159 
FrP Norway 2009 FrP Partisanship 7.918656 
       H Partisanship 2.469851   
Aged Over 50 .8296685   
Female -.6250121   
Personal Issue Salience -1.029784 
DNA Norway 2009 A Partisanship 4.984341 
      Personal Issue Salience .7980877 
  Right-wing Ideology -1.02541 
H Norway 2009 H Partisanship 3.564559   
FrP Partisanship -1.993487 
  Aged Over 50  -.5485835 
  Post-Secondary Education .9487475 
  Right-wing Ideology 2.311104 
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salience normally does not affect vote choice, but when it does, vote choice is more likely to be 
influenced by personal level issue salience. However, the multivariate analyses that looked at 
partisanship as the dependent variable told us that issue salience does have a significant influence 
on partisanship. In Finland, partisanship of every party was influenced by issue salience. In 
Iceland, there is not as clear a relationship between issue salience and vote choice or 
partisanship. In Norway, there is not a clear relationship between issue salience and vote choice 
or partisanship either. The manifesto data is not so clearly economically skewed, but Norway is 
the only country whose parties seem to be competing on mostly sociocultural issues. When 
looking at issues of importance by party voted for, it is clear that in Norway and Finland 
sociocultural issues were more likely to be in the top three issues than in Iceland. 
 There were two hypotheses presented at the start of this paper, the first was about 
whether radical right-wing party success was influenced by sociocultural issues when they were 
more salient than economic issues. When looking at the data presented, this hypothesis is 
tentatively true in all countries. The Norwegian FrP was the most electorally successful radical 
right-wing party that was looked at and Norway was the one country where public opinion did 
focus more on sociocultural issues than economic issues. The hypothesis is further supported by 
the fact that in Iceland and Finland economic issues were by far more salient in public opinion 
than sociocultural issues. The higher salience of economic issues also correlated with right-wing 
parties having no electoral success in Iceland and more moderate electoral success in Finland. 
The second hypothesis suggested that radical right-wing parties would be more successful if the 
salience of other parties’ manifestos focused on sociocultural issues. In Iceland, this is not true, 
the left-wing party focuses on sociocultural issues and there is no radical right-wing party. In 
Finland, in 2011 the mainstream right-wing party did focus on sociocultural issues more than 
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economic issues. This could, therefore, be true in Finland, as the PS’ increase in votes did 
coincide with the Kok’s introduction of more sociocultural issues to its manifesto. In Norway, 
both mainstream parties focused on sociocultural issues more in each election, so this hypothesis 
would be true.  
 This paper looked at three cases in the Nordic region, only a fraction of the cases of 
radical right-wing parties in Europe. Both the Norwegian public and parties have moved towards 
sociocultural issues, and this combination could help explain why parties are so electorally 
successful in other countries like Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, and why they may be emerging 
in Germany and the Netherlands. There is some literature on issue salience but there is room for 
much more investigation into how it relates to party success and failure in Europe, especially for 
parties like the radical right that focus on a core set of issues. Expanding these findings to see if 
they apply in similar cases across Europe could help demonstrate just how relevant issue 
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Table 1: Comparative Manifesto Project categories divided into non-economic and economic issues from 
Spies & Franzmann 2011, with updated category titles from the 2019 Codebook 
Non-economic issue categories Economic issue categories 
Per101 Foreign special relationship: 
positive 
Per102 Foreign special relationship: negative  
Per103 Anti-imperialism  
Per104 Military: positive  
Per105 Military: negative  
Per106 Peace  
Per107 Internationalism: positive  
Per108 European community: positive 
Per109 Internationalism: negative  
Per110 European community: negative  
Per201 Freedom and human rights  
Per202 Democracy  
Per203 Constitutionalism: positive  
Per204 Constitutionalism: negative  
Per301 Decentralisation 
Per302 Centralisation  
Per304 Political corruption 
Per305 Political authority  
Per501 Environmental protection  
Per502 Culture: Positive 
Per503 Equality: Positive 
Per506 Education expansion  
Per507 Education limitation  
Per601 National way of life: positive 
Per602 National way of life: negative  
Per603 Traditional morality: positive 
Per604 Traditional morality: negative 
Per605 Law and order: positive 
Per606 Civic Mindedness: positive 
Per607 Multiculturalism: positive 
Per608 Multiculturalism: negative 
Per705 Underprivileged minority groups 








Per303 Governmental and administrative 
efficiency: positive 
Per401 Free Market Economy 
Per402 Incentives: Positive 
Per403 Market regulation 
Per404 Economic planning 
Per405 Corporatism/Mixed Economy 
Per406 Protectionism: positive 
 Per407 Protectionism: negative 
Per408 Economic Growth: Positive 
Per409 Keynesian demand management 
Per410 Productivity 
Per411 Technology and infrastructure 
Per412 Controlled economy 
Per413 Nationalisation 
 Per414 Economic orthodoxy 
Per415 Marxist analysis 
 Per416 Anti-growth economy 
Per504 Welfare state expansion 
Per505 Welfare state limitation 
Per701 Labour groups: positive 
Per702 Labour groups: negative 
Per703 Agriculture and farmers 




Appendix B  
Module 3 Codebook: Variables Description 
 
“Q1a. Most important problem-egocentric-first mention. 
 
What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election? 
 
This is usually an open-ended question. Collaborators coded this variable in a detailed way and with a 
minimum of at least twenty categories.” (CSES codebook, pg 154) 
 
“Q2a. Most important problem-sociotropic-first mention. 
 
What do you think is the most important political problem facing [COUNTRY] today? 
 
This is an open-ended question. Collaborators coded this variable in a detailed way and with a minimum 




Full value labels from Finnish Election Study, 2007 and 2011 
 
Finland: What has been the most important issue to you personally in this election? (Egocentric) 
1. Pensioner issues / pensions 
2. Taxation of pensioners, subsistence 
3. Health care resources / labor shortage / working conditions 
4. Social and health care in general 
5. Wage level in health care 
6. Care of the elderly 
7. Status of family caregivers, home care 
8. Mental health care 
9. Employment/unemployment 
10. Special issues of labor policy, coping at work 
11. Status and support of families with children 
12. Education 
13. Taxation/tax policy 
14. Correcting individual taxes, tax deductions 
15. Maintaining welfare / the welfare state, social policy 
16. Special issues of welfare / social policy 
17. Low income / poverty issues 
18. Growth of income disparity / social inequality / social justice 
19. Social security 
20. Status of students 
21. Increasing the study grants / subsistence of students 
22. Energy policy 
23. Nuclear power 
24. Climate / climate change, natural disasters 
25. Nature conservation / environmental issues 
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26. Traffic policy 
27. Housing policy, rents 
28. Regional policy / keeping the whole of Finland inhabited 
29. Municipal policy / issues 
30. Agricultural issues 
31. Entrepreneur issues, prerequisites for entrepreneurship 
32. Fairer wages / social justice 
33. Worker issues, worker welfare 
34. Equality / (gender) equality 
35. Status / issues of minorities / special groups 
36. Immigrant policy 
37. Finnishness, Finland for Finns 
38. Economy / economic policy / special issues of Finnish economic policy 
39. Development of Finland in general 
40. NATO 
41. Foreign and security policy 
42. EU / EU policy, in general 
43. Peace 
44. Swedish language 
45. Government base and prime minister 
46. Other issues connected to elections and voting 
47. Values, morals 
48. Beating racism / tolerance / value pluralism / multiculturalism 
49. Changing Finnish policies / regime change / protest 
50. Animal protection 
51. Giving up economic growth / reducing consumption 
52. Gender-neutral marriage law 
53. Crime / domestic security / more police officers 
54. Grey economy 
55. Human rights 
56. Cultural policy 
57. Finnish economy / sustaining welfare / raising retirement age 
58. Poverty / universal basic income / exclusion / marginalization 
59. Negative EU issues / support indebted countries / stability funds 
60. Other problem (not specifiable) 
61. Volunteered: refused 
62. Volunteered: don't know 
63. Missing 
 
What do you think is the most important political problem facing Finland today? (Sociotropic) 
1. Foreign and security policy / international Relations / development aid / Russia 
2. EU / EU policy / bailouts / financial stability funds 
3. NATO membership 
4. Peace/threats to peace 
5. Functioning of democracy / democracy / bureacracy / corruption 
6. Politicians' and officials' actions / competence / impeccability / or fairness 
7. Economic development / global economy / economic globalization 
8. Employment / unemployment / youth unemployment 
9. Entrepreneur issues / prerequisites for entrepreneurship 
10. Health care in general 
11. Education and know-how 
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12. Poverty / low income issues / inequality / income disparity / social exclusion / suffering 
13. Housing situation / homelessness / housing prices 
14. Equality / (gender) equality 
15. Taxation and national economy 
16. Status of municipalities / municipal economy 
17. Regional policy / regional development / Regional inequality 
18. Nature conservation / environmental issues / Ecological lifestyle 
19. Elderly issues / care of the elderly 
20. Youth issues 
21. Issues of families with children 
22. Single parent issues 
23. Employee issues / subsistence / prices / cost of living 
24. Agriculture / agricultural issues 
25. Criminality / insecurity / the preservation of law and order / beggars / criminal sentences 
26. Selfishness/values/the lack or preservation of morals 
27. Immigrants / foreigner issues / multiculturalism: positive attitude / more multiculturalism and 
tolerance 
28. Nuclear power 
29. Alcohol / (illegal) drugs / other intoxicants 
30. Social security / the conservation of welfare / the support for special groups 
31. Welfare services and securing of services (in general) 
32. Shortage of nurses / nurse salaries / the shortage of doctors 
33. Pensioner issues / pensions / pensions are too small 
34. Status of young people and students / inadequacy of grants / benefits 
35. Special issues of employment opportunities and workplaces (e.g. age racism / burn out / 
insecurity) 
36. Retirement / baby boomers / aging 
37. Energy policy / energy prices 
38. Correct allocation of political decisions 
39. Climate change / nature disasters 
40. Immigrants / refugees: neutral attitudes 
41. Immigrants / refugees: negative attitudes 
42. Nationalism / rise of the true Finns 
43. Weakened status of swedish language 
44. Mental health problems / mental health services 
45. Poor protection of minority rights / support by legislation 
46. Growing racism 
47. Taxation   
48. National economy / public economy / debts 
49. Other problem (not specifiable) 
50. Volunteered: refused 













Full value labels from Icelandic Election Study, 2007 and 2009 
 
1. Foreign Policy 
2. Joining the European Union / adopting the euro 
3. Not joining the European Union / not adopting the euro 
4. The Economic crisis / bank crisis / currency crisis 
5. The Economy 
6. Economical stability 
8. Reducing public expenditure / fair distribution of public expenditure 
9. Taxes 
10. Wages / living standards / taxes 
11. Change of government / throwing the rascals out / voting in parties that have been in opposition 
12. Prices / inflation / interest rates 
13. Agriculture 
14. Fisheries 
15. The fishery quota system 
16. Holding those accountable who were responsible for the bank crisis 
17. Continuation of building up power stations / energy issues / big industry 
18. Reducing / stopping big industry 
19. Restoration / saving the country / nation 
20. Social welfare 
21. Equality, gender issues 
22. Equality, living standards 
23. Icesave (bank) 
24. Education 
25. Health matters 
26. Family matters 
27. Improving the image of Iceland (internationally) 
28. Welfare of companies 
29. Welfare of the households / the people (the Economic crisis) 
30. Employment 
31. Regional policy 
32. Transportation / Regional policy 
33. Democracy / democratic reform / honesty / political trust 
34. European issues / European Union / EEA / EFTA / the Euro 
35. Environmental issues 
36. The elderly / people with disability 
37. Immigration 
39. Energy issues / power stations 












Full value labels from Norwegian Election Study, 2005 and 2009 
 




13. Social equalization / distribution 
15. Industrial / trade politics 
16. Interest rates 
17. Oil funds 
18. Raising prices 
19. (Other) economic issues 
21. Care for the elderly 
22. Health service 
23. Age pensioners 
24. Welfare benefits 
25. Sickness benefits 
26. Modernization of public sector 
27. Housing 
28. Poverty 
29. (Other) health / social issues 
31. Kindergartens 
32. Cash benefit for families with small children 
35. (Other) child and family issues 
39. School and educational issues 
41. Abortion 
42. Gay rights 
43. (Other) welfare issues 
45. (Other) moral / religious issues 
46. EU 
51. NATO 
52. Disarmament of nuclear weapons 
53. Defense and security policy issues 
54. Climate change / policy 
55. (Other) foreign policy issues 
56. Environmental issues 
57. public transportation 
58. Oil politics / distribution of national resourses 
59. Communication / transport 
61. Decentralization / support for sparsely 
populated areas 
62. Agricultural / fishery policies 
66. Criminal policy 
67. Immigration / refugee policy 
68. Aid to developing countries 
69. Party politics 
71. The question of government alternatives 
72. Gender equality 
73. Fighting bureaucracy 
74. Public vs. Private 
76. Working life 
77. Vehicle excise duty 
78. Local government 
79. Culture 
81. UN 
82. Fight against terrorism 
83. Peace 
84. National income after the oil-age 
85. Trade 
86. Alternative energy sources 







Finland Election Study Egocentric Issues Categorization 2007 & 2011 (by author) 
Data collected and provided by Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 
 
Economic Issues Sociocultural Issues Other 
Agricultural issues 
Care of the elderly 







Growth of income disparity 
Health care resources 
Housing policy 
Increasing study grants 
Low income / poverty issues 
Mental health care 
Pensioner issues 
Poverty 
Social and health care (general) 
Social security 
Special issues of labor policy 
Special issues of welfare 




Taxation of pensioners 
The welfare state 
Traffic policy 
Wage level in health care 










Foreign and security policy 
Gender equality 
Gender-neutral marriage law 








Negative EU issues / stability funds 
Nuclear power 
Other issues connected to elections 
and voting 
Peace 
Regime change / protest 
Regional policy 
Status of students 
Swedish language 
Tolerance & multiculturalism 
Values 
Missing 
Other problem (not 
specifiable) 
Volunteered: refused 










Finland Election Study Sociotropic Issue Categorization 2007 & 2011 (by author) 
Data collected and provided by Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 
 
Economic Issues Sociocultural Issues Other 







Health care (general) 
Housing situation 
Issues of families with children 






Shortage of nurses / nurse salaries / 
the shortage of doctors 
Single parent issues 
Social security 
Special issues of employment 
Status of municipalities 
Status of young people and students / 




Alcohol / illegal drugs 
Climate change / nature disasters 






Foreign and security policy 
Gender equality 
Growing racism 
Immigrants: negative attitudes 
Immigrants: neutral attitudes 
Immigrants: positive 
Law and order 





Protection of minority rights 
Status of Swedish language 
Status of young people/students 
Values 
Missing 























Iceland Election Study Egocentric and Sociotropic Issues Categorization 2007 & 2009 (by author) 
Data collected and provided by Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 
 
Economic Sociocultural Other 
Agriculture 
Continuation of building up power 
stations/ energy issues / big industry 
Economic stability 
Employment 








The economic crisis/bank crisis/currency 
crisis 
The economy 
The fishery quota system 
Transportation / Regional policy 
Wages/living standards/taxes 
Welfare of the households / the people 
(the Economic crisis)  
Change of government / throwing 
the rascals out / 




Equality, gender issues 
European issues / European Union / 
EEA / EFTA / 
Foreign policy 
Holding those accountable who 
were responsible/ for the bank 
crisis 
Immigration 
Joining the European 
union/adopting the euro 
Not joining the European union/not 
adopting the euro 
political trust 
Regional policy 
The elderly / people with disability 
the Euro 































Norway Election Study Egocentric and Sociotropic Issues Categorization 2005 & 2009 (by author) 
Data collected and provided by Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 
Economic Sociocultural Other 
(Other) child and family issues 
(Other) economic issues 
(Other) health / social issues 
(Other) welfare issues 
Age pensioners 
Agricultural / fishery policies 
Alternative energy sources 
areas 
Care for the elderly 
Communication/transport 







Modernization of public sector 
National income after the oil-age 
Oil funds 












(Other) foreign policy issues 
(Other) moral / religious issues 
Abortion 
Aid to developing countries 
Climate change / policy 
Criminal policy 
Culture 














School and educational issues 




Other problem (not 
specifiable) 
Volunteered: refused 









The vote choice variables were coded with the relevant party responses as 1 and all other 
party responses as 0, with don’t know, missing, and refused (997/999) coded out. Partisanship 
dummy variables were created the same way as the vote choice variable, a positive coefficient 
would mean there is a positive relationship between holding the partisanship and voting for the 
party of the dependent variable, and the opposite if the coefficient is negative. The age variable, 
called “Aged Over 50”, was coded as a dummy variable with ages 17 to 49 coded as 0 and ages 
50 to 100 coded as 1. If the age variable is positive, this means that those above 50 are more 
likely to vote for the dependent variable party.  The gender variable, “Female” was coded with 
male respondents as 1 and female respondents as 2, so a positive coefficient means females are 
more likely to vote for the dependent party variable, and a negative coefficient means males are 
more likely to vote for the party.  The post-secondary education was coded as a dummy variable, 
any level of education up to the completion of high school was coded as 0 and any level of post-
secondary education (even incomplete) was coded as 1. 
The “Personal Issue Salience” variable and “Country Issue Salience” variables, were 
coded as dummy variables. “Personal Issue Salience” includes responses for the personal level 
salience question, with economic issues coded as 1 and sociocultural issues coded as 0 (for the 
categorization of issues see Appendices F, G, H, and I). The “Country Issue Salience”, includes 
all of the issues that were mentioned in responses to the country level salience question, with 
economic issues coded as 1 and sociocultural issues coded as 0 (for the categorization of issues 
see Appendices F, G, H, and I).  For both variables a positive coefficient would indicate that if 
economic issues were important to the voters, they were more likely to vote for the respective 
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party, and if the coefficient is negative it indicates that if sociocultural issues were important a 
voter is less likely to vote for the respective party.  
 
